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INTRODUCTION
The following work endeavors to trace the
rise and development of the Question of the Straits
from the earliest times to the present day.
How could navigation of the Bosphor^us and
the Dardanelles he regulated so as to permit free-
dom of navigation for all countries and safeguard
their interests, and who should act as an impartial
and faithful guardian? For centuries men and nations
sought after the answer to this question. They em-
ployed all the arts and tricks of diplomacy, all the
devices and strategies of political comhinat ions
,
and all the violence of wars.
Unfortunately, the history of the problem of
the Straits has not received the attention due it by
historians in spite of the forceful way it has pressed
itself on the Governments of the world and its conse-
quent continuing interest for the students of history.
t
CHAPTER I.
From Ancient Times to the Eighteenth Century
The question of the Straits has existed from the
beginning of European states and has always shown a two-
fold aspect - economic and political.
The political issue of the Trojan War was the con-
a)
trol of the Dardanelles. The Trojans controlled the Straits
and demanded dues from the Greeks until Agamemnon cleared
the waters for Aegean ships. Although Greek sea trade was
of little importance until the battle of Salamis, it did
touch at the southern ports of the Black Sea for Oriental
trade and the northern ports for grain and gold. After
Salamis the sea-power of Athens asserted itself, and the
keynote of her policy was to hold the Black Sea route by
her fleet, colonies, and dependencies. At the very narrow-
est point she had a colony on either side, Sestos on the
Gallipoli peninsula and Abydos on the Asiatic side. Athens
held this trade route by controlling the Dardanelles until
Sparta in the Peloponnesian War ended Athenian supremacy
by dealing a crushing defeat in the sea battle at Aegospotami
in the Hellespont itself. When her grain trade was cut off,
there was nothing left for Athens but to surrender.
The control of the Straits was an all important matter
for the sea-going Greeks, but for the Roman Empire there was
no question of the Straits until the division of the Empire
(l) Then knov/n as the Hellespont
€
2
.
at the close of the third century A. D. Rome’s interest
in Oriental trade lay in Egypt and Syria, while her grain
came from Africa and more readily accessible ports so that
she had neither of the two Athenian reasons for desiring
to control the gates to the Black Sea. Another fundamental
reason Rome was not bothered by a problem of the Straits
was that by the time she had reached them she had no rivals
to exclude, for she was mistress of sea as well as land.
The center of gravity in the Empire was shifting to
the Straits in 330 A. D. when Constantine founded Constan-
tinople as a political capital and fortress. As time went
on this city became an important port and commercial city -
the only great port to keep alive the ancient culture during
the dark ages. Its ability to do this was due not only to
the strength of its walls but to its maritime strategic
situation and its fleet which enabled it to control the
Straits much more successfully than its armies did the sur-
rounding provinces.
The rise of Mohammedanism in the seventh century
merely increased the importance of Constantinople, for with
the fall of Antioch and Alexandria., the Black Sea route
gained again the significance it had held under the Greeks
of the Aegean.
The trading cities of Italy, Pisa, Genoa, and Venice
in the eleventh century reached Constantinople where they
sought foreign merchants’ privileges of marketing and of

3.
free passage of the Straits to the ports of the Black Sea.
But each city sought it solely for itself. There was no
idea of an "open door" policy. These three chief rivals
were at constant war. Venice struck the first master "blow
by directing the fourth crusade against the Greek Empire
itself, and held the city from 1204 to 1261, during v/hich
time it assumed an overlordship of the Black Sea, forcing
both Pisa and Genoa to accept her terms. The Genoese, how-
ever, had their revenge in helping the Greeks to regain
their capital, and in receiving as reward, in addition to
the confirmation of their commercial privileges, an exclu-
sive control of the Black Sea trade. All enemies of Genoa
- meaning Venice - were denied the ports of the Empire.
Thus Genoa forced its trade on the Black Sea, planted its
colonies on the coast, and formed a sort of colonial domin-
(i)
ion on the northern and eastern shores.
The Turks were the next masters of the Straits. The
lasting results of their conquest were due to the gradual
manner in v/hich it was accomplished. It took them over a
century to establish themselves in this region. At the end
of the thirteenth century Osman I planned for himself a new
sultanate, the foundations of v/hich were laid by defeating
the Greeks of Byzantium, so that he could reach the Sea of
Marmora. His son Orkhan was able in a time of Greek dissen-
sion and treachery to gain practically the whole southern
coast of the sea and Straits. His son Suleiman crossed the
(l) Shotwell, James T. "A Short History of the Question
of Constantinople and the Straits" p. 474
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Dardanelles and seized and fortified Gallipoli in 1356.
From that time until the recent war the Turks held the
fortifications on "both sides of the Dardanelles which at
this point are only about a mile in width.
For almost one hundred years after the Turks had
taken the ports on the Dardanelles, the Byzantines held on
to Constantinople. This was due not so much to their ability
as to the general international situation which Turkish con-
trol of the Dardanelles had brought about. The Italian tra-
ding cities were now as much concerned with Turkish policy
as they had been with Byzantine. Genoa in 1387 through
diplomacy, and Venice by war in 1416 won from the Turks the
concession of a free Dardanelles. It was not a very stable
freedom, but as long as the Italians had the upper hand on
the sea, the possession of the land fortifications was not
enough to secure for the Turks the control of the passage.
The Dardanelles were only the first step towards
gaining control of the Straits. It was at the Bosphortyus
that the Turks found the key to the Black Sea. In 1452 they
built a formidable fort on the European side of the Bosphorlus,
directly opposite the one which had long stood on the Asiatic
side just at the narrowest point. Here the Sultan placed
heavy cannon and forbade any vessel to pass without express
permission. Constantinople, thus cut off from the east and
west, soon fell, and Turkish control of the Bosphorttus be-
came permanent.

However, the Black Sea remained open to Christian
shipping "because the Turks did not yet control the ports of
the Black Sea. These ships nevertheless were subjected to
the payment of tolls or annual tribute and to various harbor
and naval regulations. Any ships attempting to pass the
Straits without stopping were fired upon and sunk if they
persisted in their refusal. The Black Sea trade was thus
gradually brought under Turkish control and finally became
a monopoly in 1475, when having already overrun the southern
western, and eastern shores, Turkey took Azof and Crimea thu
acquiring the northern coast. Thus the Black Sea being sur-
rounded by Ottoman territory became a Turkish lake under the
sovereignty of the Sultans whose persistence in imposing
restrictions on foreign ships and excluding from the Straits
all ships of war caused the rule of closing the Dardanelles
and Bosphorflus to become a fundamental principle of the
settled policy of the Ottoman limp ire.
When the Turkish Empire was at its height and all
Europe was turning against the Mohammedan invader, Prance
under Francis I adopted a policy favorable to the Turk and
in 1535 concluded a treaty which laid a basis for French
supremacy in the Levant. France, of course, hoped to share
by this agreement the advantages of Turkey’s monoply of the
Indian trade, but had failed to realize the importance and
value of Vasco da Gama’s discovery in 1499 of a sea route to
India. Thus, while the other western nations turned to the
*c
6
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rich profits of the sea borne trade, France reaped no such
harvest from her agreement with the Turk as would have fallen
to her had the world remained medieval and limited to Mediter-
ranean channels for its outlet to the east.
The treaty of Francis I opened Turkish international
relations with the states of western Europe. These dealings,
known as capitulations, were treaties whereby the subjects
of the signatory states acquired the right of trading with
Turkish possessions and navigating Turkish waters for commer-
cial purposes while their legal position in the Ottoman Empire
was specifically regulated by an application of their personal
law. This first capitulation confirmed definitely the powers
of French consuls and the privileges of French residents.
French ships were entitled to sail in Ottoman waters, which
were denied to other states unless they acquired similar treaty
(i)
*
rights or sailed under the French flag. In 1540 the Venetian
Republic concluded the same type of a capitulation, while in
1579 England entered into an agreement which was identical
(2)
with that obtained by Francis I.
Since the death of a Sultan cancelled all treaties
signed by him, renewal by h^s successor was necessary. Some-
times the western powers were able to extend the privileges
previously granted. Thus, in 1569 a commercial treaty was
concluded between Charles IX of France and Selim II; in 1581
between Henry III of France and the Sultan Murad; and in 1593,
(1) Noradounghi an "Recueil d'actes int ernationaux de L'Empire
Ottoman” Vol. I, pp. 83-87
(2) Ibid pp. 146-151
c
7.
1603, 1606 and 1675 the English convention was renewed. In
1597 France gained the exclusive right to the protection of
all foreigners, except the English and the Venetians, within
Turkish territory, and in 1604 the French capitulation was
renewed at Constantinople hy Sultan Ahmed for Henry IV who,
despite keen English rivalry, remained the protector of the
foreigners and of the Holy Places in Palestine. In 1598 and
1612 the Netherlands obtained capitulations. The former com-
mercial treaties with Genoa were renewed and enlarged. At
Adrianople in 1673 the French capitulation was renewed between
Louis XIV and Mehemet IV, and additional privileges were
granted. Finally in 1740 the capitulation entered into with
Louis XV was made permanently binding, and served as a model
for all other treaties between European countries and Turkey
up to 1914.
In the eighteenth century there were a number of
treaties between Austria and Turkey, but these were not capi-
tulations and we shall look at them later. The first real
capitulation between Austria and Turkey was concluded in 1713,
although a treaty had been entered into in 1616 allowing
Austrian merchants to trade with Turkey on certain conditions.
The first capitulation between Russia and Turkey was not
signed until 1783 although there had been treaties of peace
in 1711, 1720, 1739, 1774 in which certain commercial privi-
leges were granted. In the meantime other European countries
obtained commercial and consular privileges:- Sweden in 1737;
••
.
8 .
the two Sicilies in 1740; Tuscany in 1747; Denmark in 1756;
Prussia in 1761; and Spain in 1782; so that hy the end of the
eighteenth century all the Christian countries of Europe,
except Switzerland and the States of the Church had signed
capitulations with the Ottoman Porte.
It is essential to note here that none of these agree-
ments, with the exception of the Russian, granted freedom of
navigation in the Black Sea. The Dardanelles were opened per-
mitting the ships of the nations to reach Constantinople, upon
complying with Turkish formalities at Gallipoli and in port.
The Bosphor%us remained closed. The grants of freedom of trade
in the capitulations with the western European countries are
made in general terms and the Black Sea is not specifically
excepted but the presumption was that it was not included.
An exception was made in the case of Venice for a while,
until the Turks were in a position to deal with the first
maritime power of the age. Thus "by special clauses in the
treaties of 1454 and 1479 and by the Capitulations of 1482 and
1513, the Turks granted the Venetians the privilege of trading
in the Black Sea, prior to the creation of an Ottoman marine.
But this regime always had a provisional character, and with
the decline of the Venetian shipping and the development of
that of the Ottoman Empire, it was replaced by an absolute
' (i)
closure of the Euxine to foreign ships”.
It was not until Russia finally established itself on
(l) Shotwell p. 24 Quoted from Young "Corps du Droit Ottoman"
III, p. 66 note
r
9 .
the northern shores at the end of the eighteenth century that
Turkey was obliged formally to surrender its policy of exclu-
sion of foreign shipping from the Black Sea.

CHAPTER II
The Arrival of Russia
From the end of the seventeenth century, the history
of Turkey is a long story of decline, 'what was one of the
most powerful of the Great Powers was doomed to become the
wsick-man M of Europe and the objective of the expansion
policy of Russia who was now about to threaten the Turkish
monopoly of the Black Sea.
The position of Russia was different from that of
other European nations. Possessing extensive continental
territories and inadequate access to the sea, she realized
the necessity of pushing her way to the coast and acquiring
permanent maritime outlets. This became the definite object
of Russian national policy; and to achieve it much time,
money, and energy were expended.
In 1696 Peter the Great took Azov and then placed,
for the first time, a Russian warship on the Black Sea. By
the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, Turkey was forced to surren-
der nearly all the Danube Valley (Hungary and Transylvania)
to Austria; Podolia and the Ukraine to Poland; the Morea to
Venice; and Azov to Russia. Furthermore, the payment of
tribute by the Christian states to Turkey was stopped. By
this treaty the first dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was
effected, and the interminable sinister policy of intrigues
and rivalries among the European Powers in regard to Turkey
c
11 .
was inaugurated. In 1700, Peter the Great, with character-
istic energy and aggressiveness, sent for the first time an
embassy to Constant inople in order to conclude a treaty of
%
peace which was to secure for Russian shipping the right to
navigate the Black Sea from Azov to Taganrog as far as Con-
stantinople. The envoy was sent on hoard a Russian man-of-
war, one of the squadron Peter had built in the taking of
Azov, but the Turk was not to be overawed, and the Russian
envoy received the irrevocable decision of the Porte that
no foreign vessel should ever sail ’’the virgin waters of
(i)
the Black Sea. Thus negotiations failed; the Turk still
maintained that Russian ships should not sail out of the Sea of
Azov, and that Russian goods destined for Constant inople
(2)
should cross the Black Sea in Turkish ships.
Due to frequent inroads into Turkish territory by the
Russians the Turkish government, encouraged by the intriguing
diplomacy of Prance and Sweden, declared war against Russia
in 1710, Peter was already fighting Sweden, but, heartened
by ^his victory over Charles XII at Pultava and his acquisi-
tion of the Baltic provinces and a part of Finland, he hurried
south but was defeated by the Turks and forced to sign the
(3)
Treaty of Pruth in July 1711 whereby he had to restore Azov
(4)
and his former conquests on the Black Sea. To regain the
position lost by this treaty became the determined policy of
Peter’s successors.
(1) Mischef, p. "La Her Noir et les detroits de Constantinople"
Ch. I
(2) Goriainow, S. M. "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles" p.2
(3) Ibid. Ch. I, p. 1
(4) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 243-253
cc
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Turkey was just as successful against the Venetian
Republic in 1715 and conquered the Morea. The following year
Venice concluded an alliance with Charles VI, against whom
the Porte declared war. Charles, however, completely defeated
the Ottoman forces and captured Belgrade. Consequently by
the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, Austria gained a territorial
triumph, consolidating her possession of Hungary and securing
Belgrade, the greater part of Serbia, and parts of Bosnia and
Wallachia. If Charles VI had concentrated more on this war
against Turkey, he might have succeeded in extending Austrian
interests on the Danube and in the Balkan States as well as
beating Russia in the race to Constant inople.
In 1722 Russia and Turkey cooperated in the Persian
War, and in 1724 concluded a partition treaty. The Persians,
in spite of the Turk’s intervening successes, won a complete
victory at the end of 1734. In order to keep the Turks occu-
pied in Persia at the time of the War of the Polish Succession,
Anne of Russia formed an alliance with the famous adventurer
Nadir Shah giving him assistance against the Sultan Ahmed III.
The latter was forced to make a peace in 1735 by which he
ceded territory. In 1736 Nadir Shah was elected King of Persia.
Russia and Austria had concluded an alliance in 1726
whereby each was to aid the other. in the event of a Turkish
war and having come to an under standing in regard to Poland,
they signed the Treaty of Vienna, 1735, which made possible a
concerted attack on Turkey and a further dismemberment of her
r
13.
empire. Thus Russia was afforded an excellent opportunity to
wipe out the humiliation suffered by Peter the Great at the
Pruth. On account of the unneutral conduct of the Porte
during the ¥ar of the Polish Succession, the Tartar invasions
across the Ukraine borders, and the disputes in regard to
certain territories north of the Caucasus, Anne did not have
to look for a "casus belli”.
The immediate successors of Peter the Great finding
u)
the Straits closed to the navy of the Russian Empire felt
more keenly than ever that it was imperative to secure the
right to pass the Straits both for warships and merchantmen;
to gain possessions on the Euxine and obtain a foothold in the
Crimea; to consolidate their position in the south by putting
down the plundering Tartar hordes that were subject to Turkish
rule; to take from Ottoman hands the control of the five great
rivers: the Dniester, Dnieper, Bug, Don, and Kuban.
Preparations were therefore made for war. In January
1737 Austria joined Russia in a secret alliance; but notwith-
standing this combination the Turks offered a firm resistance.
By 1739 Austria was exhausted and concluded a separate ueace
(2)
at Belgrade. During these negotiations the rest of Europe
feared Russia would gain control of the Mediterranean commerce.
Prance, through her ambassador at Const ant inople
,
succeeded
in sowing dissension between the allies and in magnifying the
military preparations and resources of the Porte. All that
Austria had gained at Passarowitz was now sacrificed. Russia,
(1) Goriainowiji S. M. "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles” Ch. I, p.l
(2) Uoradounghian Yol. I, pp. 243-253
et
14.
unable to continue the campaign unaided, and fearing a Swedish
(i)
attack, concluded peace at Belgrade later in the same month
on terms proposed by the French ambassador Villeneuve. Russia
was obliged to restore her conquests except Azov and its
districts, the forts of which were to be destroyed. It for-
bade Russia to maintain or construct a fleet or other ships
in the Sea of Azov or in the Black Sea and repeated the rule
that all Russian commerce on the Black Sea should be in
Turkish ships. This check to Russian expansion angered the
Russians whose economic and military development had brought
them to the shores of the Black Sea. The peace was also con-
sidered a signal victory for French diplomacy, and it was as
a reward for the services of Louis XV that Turkey entered into
the great capitulation of 1740.
With the accession of Catherine II, 1762, the question
of the Dardanelles was attacked by Russia with redoubled
energy and determination. It was she who conquered the Black
Sea coastlands for Russia. The treaty of 1764 between
Catherine and Frederick the Great, promising mutual aid in
case of war and agreeing on the disposal of the Polish throne,
alarmed the Sultan who soon found a cause for war in the
actions of Russian agents who aroused the Greeks, Bosnians,
and Montenegrins against Ottoman rule and in the pursuit of
Polish Confederates by Russian troops into Turkish territory.
The Porte, encouraged by Vergennes, the French ambassador,
declared war on Russia, October 1768 - a war that was to prove
(l) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 845 265— t
t
15.
disastrous to Turkey. As early as 1769 we find Russia, Prussia,
and Austria planning a partition of Poland, the dissolution
of the Turkish Empire, and the establishment of a Turkish
(i)
Republic. Russian military progress on land was very pleas-
ing to Catherine, and on sea she sent her fleet around Europe
by way of Gibraltar in 1770 to blockade the Dardanelles and
to reach Constantinople from the west - a feat it almost
achieved. In the Black Sea the Russian fleet was so success-
ful, that the European Powers became alarmed. Prance having
urged Turkey to make war, naturally hoped for Russian defeat;
England did not wish Russia to secure the passage of the
Bosphortyus; and Prussia was afraid of being dragged into a
conflict with Austria. The continental tension was relieved,
however, by the First Partition of Poland, while England was
herself occupied with American difficulties. In 1773 Turkey,
fearing Russian designs on Constantinople, rejected the terms
for peace that were offered. She continued the struggle
with resulting defeats, ending in the rout at Shumla, and
was obliged to sue for peace. Catherine, occupied with the
Pugachev rebellion at home ordered an end to hostilities
( 2 )
and concluded the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardj ii in 1774, which
although not satisfying her eastern ambitions, was one of
the most advantageous transactions ever effected by Russia
and marked the first great milestone in Russia’s progress.
Although Russia’s territorial gains on the Black Sea were not
p ' '^oV.ert
- IjtUure Ae\we t<°] at V\ av \i «.v<l b
y
- [i o M . 3 0 3 \ ^ ^ 1
(2) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 319-334
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large, since the Tartars were merely to he freed from the
Turks and made independent, still the foothold had heen
gained from which her conquests could he increased. In the
same way a limited recognition of her rights to protect her
co-religionists could later he made the excuse for an inter-
ference in Turkish affairs which alarmed other powers and led
to the Crimean 7/ar. But the clause which is of chief interest
here is that which opened the Black Sea and the Straits to
merchant ships flying the Russian flag. Russian merchants
were to he given the same privileges as "the most favored
' (i)
nations'* England and France.
The Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii ended the exclusive
Turkish control of the Straits and the Black Sea and thereby
inaugurated the modern phase of the Eastern question. More-
over, it occupies a unique position in Russo-Turki sh relations,
for all previous treaties between Russia and Turkey were ex-
pressly cancelled by it and all subsequent ones down to the
Crimean War were based upon it.
However, Russia soon decided that the advantages
derived from the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii were inadequate
since her freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the
Straits depended on the Sublime Porte which could not be
trusted because of the pressure brought to bear on it by the
representatives of the Powers at Constantinople
. Moreover,
the same commercial privileges that had been wrung from
(l) Article XI

17.
Turkey "by means of costly wars were being conferred on other
countries. Catherine, therefore, felt that a more definite
arrangement was indispensable for the natural expansion of
Russian commerce and dominion, hot long after the treaty of
1774 was concluded, Russia began to intervene in Turkish
affairs. The Porte offered resistance and prepared for a
resumption of hostilities. Eventually a convention was
(i)
signed in 1779 whereby the provisions of the Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji i were confirmed and made more explicit and
the privileges of navigation in the Black Sea were amplified.
Turkish authority in the Danubian provinces was restricted,
and Potemkin's nominee was recognized as Khan of the Crimea.
In 1783 a sweeping commercial treaty elaborated the conditions
under which the Russian commercial flag was to be permitted,
like the flag of England and Prance, entry into Turkish ports.
Russian commercial ships were to be permitted to pass the
Straits without payment of any customs dues.
In 1782 Russian troops invaded and occupied the Crimea.
In 1784 - England acquiescing and Prance being occupied in the
( 2 )
west - the Treaty of Const ant inople was signed by which
Turkey recognized the annexation of the Crimea and the Kuban.
One month later Austria obtained from the Porte the right of
(3)
free passage for her commercial flag.
Catherine's ambition was great. It aimed at nothing
less than the conquest of Constant inople itself. Having
(1) Horadounghian Vol. I, n. 338
(2) Ibid Vol. I, pp. 377-378
(3) Ibid Vol. I, pp. 379-382
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secured Austria as an ally she allowed, in 1789, the in-
trigues of her agents in the Ottoman dominions to he resumed.
In the following year with the view of reestablishing a Greek
(i)
Empire at Constantinople the Empress undertook her famous
journey to the Crimea, met the Polish king on her way, and
was joined by Joseph II at Kherson. At Sebastopol she reviewed
a powerful navy that had been created by herself. The Russian
ambassador submitted fresh demands to the Porte officials
which replied with a counter-proposal involving the restora-
tion of the Crimea. When the ambassador declared that he had
no power to sign such a document, he was thrown into prison,
and the Turks, relying on the support of England and Prussia
declared war. Prance remained neutral, but Austria joined
Russia in 1788. In 1789 Turkey suffered a series of defeats
and was saved only by the confusion in the Austrian dominions
and by the intervention of the Triple Alliance - England,
Holland, and Prussia. Austria withdrew from the war by the
( 2 )
Peace of Sistova in August 1791, but Russia continued single-
handed on her road of success. Plans for the partition of
Turkey were elaborated, but Catherine’s desire to carry out
her Polish policy while Austria and Prussia were occupied
with Prance made Poland the victim instead. At Jassy in 1792
(3)
a peace was concluded confirming the Treaty of Kut chuk-Kainard j i i
,
(1) She probably conceived this idea when "the Voltaireans and
the encyclopaedists, several of whom were on terms of friendship
with the Russian Empress, acclaimed the treaty (Kut chuk-Kainard j i i
)
as a prelude to the reestablishment of the Greek Empire". Although
"some time before", -- "Potemkin presented a project to Catherine
for expelling the Turks from Europe and establishing a Greek
Empire under a Russian grand-duke". Phillipson and Buxton pp. 27-2;
(2) Noradounghian Vol. II, p. 13
(3) Ibid Vol. II, pp. 16-21
«
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extending the western "boundary of Russia to the Dniester,
and giving to Russia all the coast of the Black Sea between
the above mentioned river and the Bug, as well as the fortress
of Ochakoff. The Russians surrendered all their conquests
west of the Dniester, and the commercial treaty of 1783 was
confirmed "since commerce is the truest and most constant
bond of reciprocal harmony". Catherine r s plans were thus
progressing when in 1796 her death put an end to them.
r
CHAPTER III
The Napoleonic Era
The reorganization of Russia as a great European
power made the question of the Straits one of general
European concern, not only as a commercial question but as
a strategic problem. The Turkish commercial monopoly had
been broken but the Sultan’s right to control and to pro-
hibit the passage of foreign warships through his territorial
waters remained unimpaired. The problem of naval strategy
was still to be settled.
Catherine's successor, Paul I, desiring to give Russia
a respite from war, favored advancing the Turkish policy by
means of diplomacy. The encouragement given by Prance to
Poland, the Treaty of Campo-Formi o (1797), and Napoleon's
expedition into Egypt made the French a menace to Russia who
reserved to' herself alone the right to interfere in the East.
Napoleon's Egyptian expedition drew a third contestant,
England, into the field. She noted the strategic importance
of the Near Eastern route to India and began to play in earnest
that role in the Levant which she has since followed - that
of the supporter of the Ottoman Empire. Since the route? to
India and Odessa crossed at Constantinople, Russia became the
main competitor of England for the control of that people
which controlled the Straits.
The first effect of Napoleon’s activities in the East

'.Then the Sultan
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was to throw Turkey into the hands of Russia,
appealed to Paul for assistance, it was readily given. A
fleet set sail for Constantinople, and, with the permission
of the Porte, entered the Bosphor^us in September, 1798. A
Russo-Turkish convention quickly drawn up in October was
(i)
converted into the Treaty of Constantinople in December. The
following January England became a party to this alliance.
This agreement between Russia and Turkey remained in force
for eight years. Each undertook to protect the possessions
of the other; Russia was to furnish the Porte with twelve
vessels, and, if necessary with an army of seventy-five to
eighty thousand men, and Turkey was to provide for the main-
tenance of all the ships and men. Turkey agreed also to the
free passage of Russian war ships through the Straits. By
the combined action of the Russo-Turkish fleets, the Drench
were forced to withdraw from the Ionian Islands, which they
obtained by the Treaty of Campo-Forrnio . The barriers once
down, the Russian fleet passed and repassed the Straits,
regardless of treaty restrictions and Russia began definitely
( 2 )
to formulate plans for the partition of Turkey.
In 1800 Count Rostopchin proclaimed that the dismember-
ment of the Ottoman Empire was the only solution of the Eastern
question and the only national policy of Russia. His plan of
partition gave Russia the largest share and England no share
at all. Austria, Prussia, and France were to be the other
(1) Koradounghian Vol. II, pp. 24-31
(2) Dascovici, Hi colas MLa question du Bosphore et des
Dardanelles" pp. 147-148

Paul was in favor
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three nations taking part in the division,
of the scheme and at the beginning of 1801 he allied himself
with France, against England, in order to invade India across
Asia and overthrow English power in the East. The murder of
the Tsar in March, and the accession of Alexander I, who was
in favorjof friendly relations with England, prevented the
accomplishment of the plan.
The new Emperor’s Turkish policy v/as to preserve,
rather than destroy, a weak Ottoman power at the Straits,
and to turn its weakness to Russia’s advantage. The following
year the minister Count Victor Kotchoubey presented a report
to the Tsar which laid down as a fundamental principle of
imperial politics that it v/as an advantage for Russia to have
weak neighbors. He showed that only two courses were open:
either to accelerate the dissolution of Turkey and share her
dominions v/ith Austria and France, or to preserve her exis-
tence by v/arding off every menace conducive to dismemberment;
and that of these alternatives the latter was preferable.
This view advocated by Kotchoubey v/as accepted. In March of
1802 the Peace of Amiens was concluded by England and France,
and in June of the same year Turkey made a separate commercial
(i)
treaty with France whereby the Porte’s possession of Egypt
and all its territories was recognized, and the French capi-
tulation of 1740 was renewed v/ith additional provisions giving
the French commercial flag the right to traverse the Straits
and the freedom of the Black Sea.
(l) Moradounghian Vol. II, pp. 51-53
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Before the expiration of the Russo-Turkish alliance
of 1798, the Porte proposed negotiations for its renewal.
7/hereupon the Russian minister, Italinsky, at Constant inople
,
was charged to establish a close union with Turkey, with a
view to her participating in a possible coalition against
Prance, and to secure for Russia the right of intervention in
Turkey in order to protect the Christian subjects of the
(i)
Sultan and ameliorate their position. In the course of his
negotiations Italinsky urged the maintenance of Article X
of the Treaty of Constantinople, which closed the Straits to
the warships of other countries. He observed in his report
to the Russian Government that if he did not insist on an
express renewal of this provision, the English would obtain
a passage for their warships to the Black Sea, and the French
would follow suit. Accordingly, he secured the insertion in
the projected secret convention of a clause which closed
the Straits to the military flag of every nation, opened
them to the Russian, and provided for their defense by the
contracting parties in case any armed ship attempted to enter.
This same clause was inserted in the treaty concluded with
( 2 )
the Porte in September 1805. Though the Black Sea v/as not?
possessed in common by the two signatories, the region of
vital importance, namely the Straits, remained under the
exclusive sovereignty of the Sultan. But Russian warships
(1) Gorfainow pp. 4 and 5
(2) Horadounghian Vol. II, pp. 70-77
wu
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acquired the liberty to proceed to the Ionian Islands
during the stay of the Russian troops there for the purpose
of protecting the new republic.
The treaty of 1805 was entered into for a period of
nine years. Hardly was it concluded when Napoleon, flush
with new victories over the Russians and Austrians, sent the
adroit diplomatist, General Sebastiani, on a special embassy
to Turkey. He soon induced the Ottoman Government to recog-
nize the imperial title of Napoleon and urged a repudiation
of the alliance with Russia and the firm retention of the
Danubian provinces, Wallachia and Moldavia. Moreover,
Sebastiani drew the attention of the Porte to the passage of
the Russian warships through the Straits, and insisted on a
renewal of the old restrictions, despite the authorization
granted by the treaty of 1798 and renewal by that of 1805.
Italinsky was asked, in a friendly manner, to stop
the passage of the Russian warships. The Turkish minister
pointed out that Article IV of the recent treaty did not
apply to the then existing circumstances, because the agree-
ment was made in contemplation of a common and defensive war.
Therefore, to permit Russian naval forces to pass for the
purpose of adopting offensive measures against the French
possession of the Adriatic would not be in keeping with it.
Russia replied that Article IV was clear and precise; that
the word 'war 1 was not mentioned in it; that the question
€c
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of distinguishing "between an offensive and defensive war
did not arise; that the ultimate destination of the Russian
forces passing through the Bosphortus and the Dardanelles
was no concern of the Porte, which was entitled to ascertain
only that the forces needed to pass for the purpose of pro-
ceeding to Corfu. However, in April 1806 Russia received a
note asking her to discontinue the passage of warships.
Sebastiani stirred up Turkish feelings with regard
to the Danubian provinces, and as a result, the Sultan de-
posed the hospodars in August - an act which to the Tsar
constituted a legitimate cause for war. Furthermore, the
Porte refused to abide by the treaty of 1805, and reiterated
its intention to prevent the passage of Russian warships.
Italinsky was ordered to demand the observance of the treaty,
and in case of refusal, to ask for his passports. In October
the Russian forces on the Dniester were ordered to invade
Moldavia, and Italinsky was instructed to obtain a declara-
tion from the Porte that it would adhere to its former under-
taking and abstain from interfering with the passage of
Russian warships. Before this order could reach Constantinople,
the Russian ambassador was required by the Ottoman authorities
to leave the capital, and upon his departure Turkey declared
war.
England came to the support of her ally Russia and
sent a fleet which forced the Dardanelles and actually reached
..
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Constantinople. The energy of Sebastiani in hastily organ-
izing the defence of the city caused its v;ithdrawal without
having achieved its purpose. In the meantime Russia had
informed Turkey that her invasion of Moldavia was due to the
Porte's violation of the treaty of 1805, and proposed that
it should enter into an alliance with Russia and England,
provided it would observe strictly the existing treaties,
and maintain for Russian warships the right of passing the
Straits. It was shown that the Russian army was sent to the
Danube, not for conquest, but to protect Turkey from the
designs of France, and that they would evacuate the princi-
palities as soon as Sebastiani was dismissed and the required
guarantees given.
Owing to the internal condition of Turkey, however,
events took an unexpected turn. The Government was distracted
by rebellions in the army and insurrections among the people.
In May 1807 there took place a revolution which Napoleon
made use of as a pretext for reconciling himself with Russia
by the Peace of Tilsit, in July, whereby Alexander surrendered
the Ionian Islands and Cataro.
At the end of this same year Napoleon and Alexander
entered upon a long and tortuous scheme for the partition of
Turkey. The plan never materialized in spite of a series of
negotiations. Each emperor feared that the other cherished
ideas of aggrandizement and they could not agree as to who
should hold Constantinople and the Straits. Thus no agreement

But in October
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was arrived at in regard to the partition,
of 1808 these same two entered the Treaty of Erful against
Great Britain.
Hore important than these arrangements as far as the
Straits were concerned was the fact that England and Turkey
were forced to become friendly again. The latter was alarmed
at the Franco-Russian reconciliation and feared that the Tsar
now would have a free hand in the East, and that the Porte
could no longer count on French support to resist his designs.
England was only too anxious to be on pacific terms with the
Ottoman Empire. The result was the Treaty of Constantinople,
u)
commonly known as the Peace of the Dardanelles, which contained
the first formal assertion, in an international treaty, of
the principle of the closing of the Straits to ships of war.
The Porte, mindful of the recent appearance of the British
fleet before Constantinople, definitely stipulated that since
it had at all times been forbidden for vessels of war to enter
into the canal of Constantinople, that is, into the Straits
of the Dardanelles and into the waters of the Black Sea the
court of Britain promised also to conform to this principle.
It went further by stating that the ’ancient rule of the
( 2 )
Ottoman Empire’ was to be observed henceforth in times of
peace with reference to any Powers whatsoever. This was very
cleverly done, because thus Turkey insisted on her sovereign
(1) IToradounghian Vol. II, p. 81
(2) This expression was ’’afterwards frequently repeated, and
not only by Turkey, according to the exigencies of State
interest arising in the remarkable vicissitudes of Euro-
pean political relationships”.
Phillipson and Buxton ’’The Question of the Bosphor^us
and the Dardanelles” p. 44
(f
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rights and won from Britain a formal recognition of them.
In reality, Britain became the guardian of the Straits al-
most as much as Turkey. This provision constitutes the
germ of the international convention laid down in the Straits
Convention of 1841 when England again was to have its say as
(i)
to the settlement of the question.
Turkey, relying on British support, now renewed hos-
tilities against Russia (1809). Due to Napoleon’s prepara-
tions to invade Russia, the latter’s plans for a march on
Constantinople were cancelled and the Treaty of Bucharest
( 2 )
was signed in May 1812. Moldavia and Vallachia were restored
to Turkey; Russia’s frontier was advanced; and existing
treaties between the two parties v/ere confirmed. But no
provision was made regarding the Straits, nor was there any
mention of the right of passage that had been conferred on
the Russian military flag by the Convention of 1805. So
upon the whole, the Napoleonic period left the matter as
Turkey and England wished.
(1) Shotwell ”A Short History of the Question of Constantinople
and the Straits” p. 497
(2) Noradounghian Vol . II, pp . 86-92

CHAPTER IV
Russian Supremacy
At the Congress of Vienna the question of the Straits
was not considered. The British supported Metternich's plan
to guarantee the existence of Turkey, but the Porte was sus-
picious of too much guardianship by the British, which sug-
gested too nearly the idea of a protectorate. In a sense,
therefore, Turkey played into the hands of the Tsar, who
wished to avoid any guarantee of Ottoman integrity; and Turkey
v/as still kept outside the European state-system.
In the meantime Russia v/as growing in population and
in commerce, her military power was increasing considerably,
and her navy was being enlarged; and her political position
in Europe was becoming more important then ever. Hence the
Ottoman Government always remained distrustful of the Russian
policy. However, the Tsar, at the instance of some of the
European powers, notably England and Austria, denounced the
Greek War of Independence (1821-1829).
Russo-Turki sh friction was soon renewed through the
seizure in the Dardanelles of Greek vessels flying the Russian
flag, the refusal of the Porte to withdraw its military forces
from the Danubian provinces, and the execution of the Greek
Patriarch and two of his bishops, in retaliation for massacres
committed by the Greeks. The Russian people clamored for war
but official England parleyed with its "ancient ally" the Turk,
44
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and played with Metternich upon the pacific temper of
Alexander I. But when Nicholas I took control of Russia in
1825. he quickly cowed the Porte into accepting the Treaty
(i)
of Akkerman which conceded to Russia her demands relative
to the evacuation of the Principalities, the cession of cer-
tain Circassian fortresses, and the unrestricted enjoyment
by the Russian commercial flag of liberty of navigation in
all Ottoman waters.
( 2 )
Meanwhile, Britain, by the Treaty of London in July
1827, brought about an accord with Prance and Russia for joint
intervention in the Eastern conflict to secure the autonomy
of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan; but the British
reluctance to weaken the Ottoman power, which muddled British
policy with reference to Greece, finally left it to the Tsar
to exert the coercion necessary for securing a settlement.
The Russian armies marched across the Balkans for the first
time and forced upon the Turk the humiliating terms of the
( 3 )
Treaty of Adrianople in September 1829.
This treaty is one of the most important in the history
of the Eastern question. It not only recognized the indepen-
dence of Greece, which marked a further step in the dissolution
of the Turkish Empire, but it granted Anapi and Poti to Russia
and confirmed the existing treaty rights of Russia in regard
to her subjects' freedom of trade in Turkey, and freedom of
navigation in the Straits and the Black Sea as seen in Article VII
Cl) Martens "Nouveau Recueil rr Vol. VI, p. 1053
(2) Ibid Vol. XII, p. 465
(3) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 166-173
«
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which ran as follows (the first paragraph deals with freedom
of trade in Turkey) :-
'Russian subjects shall enjoy, throughout the whole
extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as by sea, the
full and entire freedom of trade secured to them by the treaties
concluded heretofore between the two high contracting Powers.
This freedom of trade shall not be molested in any v/ay, nor
shall it be fettered in any case, or under any pretext, by any
prohibition or restriction whatsoever, not in consequence of
any regulation or measure, whether of public government or
internal legislation, Russian subjects, ships, and merchan-
dise, shall be protected from all violence and imposition.
The first shall remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the Russian minister and consuls; Russian ships
shall never be subjected to any search on the part of the
Ottoman authorities, neither out at sea nor in any of the ports
or roadsteads under the dominion of the Sublime Porte; and all
merchandise or goods belonging to a Russian subject, may,
after payment of the custom house dues imposed by the tariffs,
be freely sold, deposited on land in the warehouses of the
owner or consignee, or transhipped on board another vessel of
any nation whatsoever, without the Russian subject being re-
quired, in this case, to give notice of the same to any of the
local authorities, and much less to ask their permission so
to do. It is expressly agreed that the different kinds of
wheat coming from Russia shall partake of the same privileges
i
(J
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and that their free transit shall never, under any pretext,
suffer the least difficulty or hindrance.
'
The second paragraph of the same article states free
passage to Russian merchant vessels in the Straits. It
reads :
-
r The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial
care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea, particu-
larly shall be impeded in no manner whatsoever. For this
purpose it admits and declares the passage of the Strait of
Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles to be entirely
free and open to Russian vessels under the merchant flag,
laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for
the purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether, coming
from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the Black Sea,
such vessels, provided they be merchant ships, whatever their
size and tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoy-
ance of any kind, as above provided. The two Courts shall
agree upon the most fitting means for preventing all delay
in issuing the necessary instructions. In virtue of the
same principle the passage of the Strait of Constantinople
and that of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all
the merchant ships of Powers who are at peace with the Sublime
Porte, whether going into the Russian ports of the Black Sea
or coming from them, laden or in ballast, upon the same con-
ditions which are stipulated for vessels under the Russian flag.1 »
'.
.
.
33.
The last paragraph dealing with freedom of trade and
navigation in the Black Sea:- 'Lastly, the Sublime Porte,
recognizing in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of se-
curing the necessary guarantees for this full freedom of
trade and navigation in the Black Sea, declares solemnly that
on its part not the least obstacle shall ever, under any pre-
text whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above all it promises
never to allow itself henceforth to stop or detain vessels
laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations
with whom the Ottoman Porte shall not be in a state of declared
war, which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of
Constantinople and the of the Dardanelles, on their way from
the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean
into the Russian ports of the Black Sea. And if, which God
forbid, any one of the stipulations contained in the present
article should be infringed, and the remonstrances of the
Russian minister thereupon should fail in obtaining a full and
prompt redress, the Sublime Porte recognizes beforehand in
the Imperial Court of Russia the right of considering such an
infraction as an act of hostility, and of immediat ely having
recourse to reprisals, against the Ottoman Empire.*
So we see that the Treaty of Adrianople conferred great
advantages on Russia v/ith regard to Turkey. The privileges
of her subjects in the Ottoman dominions were extended, and
surpassed even those acquired by French subjects in the great
capitulation of 1740. Some years before the conclusion of
!
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the treaty Russia had tried to secure the right of passage
for her warships, hut this determination was not realized, as
she had to reckon throughout, not only with opposition from
the Sultan, hut with firm resistance from the leading maritime
powers of Europe. However, the Tsar now secured entirely un-
disturbed navigation for his commercial flag; no hindrance
whatever was to he imposed on his merchantmen passing the
Straits, and it was actually stipulated - a provision of this
kind being of rare occurrence in international documents -
that any act of interference should he considered a violation
justifying recourse to reprisals.
In May of 1830 a treaty was concluded between the
United States and Turkey which accorded to merchantmen of the
United States, in the same way as to those of the most favored
nation, the liberty to pass the ’canal of the imperial residence*,
and to enter and leave the Black Sea either laden or in ballast.
(i)
No mention was made of warships.
In 1832, the existence of the Ottoman Empire was threat-
ened by the great revolt of Mehemet Ali
,
whose troops, over-
running most of Asiatic Turkey, were threatening the Straits.
Again, as in the Napoleonic crisis, Russia profited. France
sided with the cunning Albanian adventurer; England declined
to act; and the hard pressed Sultan was forced to invite Russia
to come in, with fleet and army, and save him from the rebels.
The results were a Russian fleet and troops for the defense of
(l) Phillipson and Buxton p. 54
".
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Constantinople itself, the passage of the Dardanelles "by
Russian warships, and the establishment of what amounted to
a Russian protectorate over Turkey.
The treaty which embodied these conditions was signed
(i)
at Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833. By it Russia guaranteed the
existence of an independent Turkey; both signatories agreed
to peace, amity and alliance, a confirmation of all existing
treaties, and a duration of this treaty for eight years.
A separate and secret article was added to the main
text. It ran:-
*In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the
patent treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the
Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high
contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually
substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the
safety of their respective dominions, nevertheless, His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the
Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconveni ence which might
be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask
for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte
under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman
Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in
case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the
patent treaty, shall confine its action in favor of the Imperial
Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that
is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter
(l) Noradounghi an Vol. II, pp. 229-231
c
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therein under any pretext whatsoever.*
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi marks the zenith of
Russian influence at Constant inople , and the secret clause is
thejexpression of it. While its ambiguity has been the sub-
ject of much discussion, it was taken by Russia, at least,
to mean that it guaranteed a free passage for Russian warships
through the Straits "in case of need" - which covers a multi-
tude of sins - and closed the entrance to the Black Sea to
every other power.
The conclusion of this treaty aroused the fears of the
western Powers. England and Prance made formal protests in
notes of similar type. When the Russian Baltic fleet was
permitted to pass the Straits after an Anglo-French squadron
had made a demonstration at Tenedos without being allowed to
enter them, Lord Palmerston objected that since Russian war-
ships had been granted access to the Dardanelles, those of
Great Britain claimed the same right in virtue of the Anglo-
Turkish treaty of 1809.
In spite of all protests, Russia applied herself to
guard with jealous vigilance the privileges she acquired by
the treaty. Thus in 1835 an American frigate reached Constan-
tinople and asked permission to enter the Black Sea. The
Porte having submitted the request to Boutenieff, the Russian
ambassador, the latter advised a refusal, for fear that the
European Powers use the incident as a pretext for demanding
authorization for their own ships to pass the Straits.

CHAPTER V
Russia Against Western Europe
The secret clause of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
was soon whispered abroad, and the disturbance it caused was
reflected in European diplomacy. While England and France
protested, Nesselrode and Metternich signed the secret Con-
(i)
vent ion of Munchengratz in 1833 whereby both parties agreed
to combine their efforts for the maintenance of the Turkish
Empire in case it was threatened with dissolution through
the designs of any political combination; and should their
efforts to prevent dissolution fail, they bound themselves
to act in accord in every thing concerning the establi shrnent
of the new order of things. This was a clever means on the
part of Metternich to draw from Russia an avowal of innocent
purposes, which tided Europe through the crises by paving
the way to an Anglo-Russian understanding. The insincerity
of Turkey toward Russia, which had imposed such humiliating
terms upon it, also made Russia* s triumph less secure and
therefore less menacing to the interests of the rest of Europe.
In 1839 war broke out again between the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali
,
resulting in the complete defeat of the Turk.
The Ottoman Empire again seemed about to dissolve, with Russia
waiting to share the spoils on the north and France about to
profit in Egypt by its friendship for Mehemet Ali. Metternich
had, at the outbreak of the war, proposed action by the
(l) Mart ens-Recueil Vol. IV, pp. 445 seq.
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European Concert, and France and England quickly took up the
idea of common action, "but French public opinion objected to
too close association with English aims. Russia, taking ad-
vantage of this divergence of opinion, refused to join and
advised the Sultan to make peace with Hehemet directly, with-
%
out reference to Europe. The Tsar felt that any action of
the Powers, if they came together, would undo the advantages
he had held since Unkiar-Skelessi . However, Metternich
anticipating objections, had the Austrian ambassador at
Constant inople present the Sultan a collective note from the
Five Powers, stating that they had reached an agreement on
the Eastern question, and warning the Porte to refrain from
any final decision without their concurrence and to await the
results of their interest in its welfare.
Baron Brunnow was sent to London to sow dissension
between France and England. The Tsar’s strong personal dis-
like of France was an element in the situation playing into
the plans of Palmerston whose objections to the French plan
of favoring Mehemet Ali’s ambitions upon Syria were soon
shared by Berlin and Vienna as well as St. Petersburg.
Palmerston was astounded when the Russian ambassador went so
far as to intimate a willingness to reconsider the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, stating that the Tsar had regarded that
treaty not as a means for establishing an absolute protectorate
over Turkey but as a measure of security for the Porte. The
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi might be revised by proclaiming the
‘.
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closing of the Straits at all times a universally recognized
public law of Europe. Upon the basis of such plans Russia
then suggested that England's fleet attack Mehemet* s port of
Alexandria while the Russian army went to Constantinople to
safeguard the capital from the rebels. Palmerston naturally
refused to enter upon a plan which brought the Russians to
Constant inople alone, and it was only after long drawn-out
(i)
negotiations, to which Prance was not a party that an agree-
ment was reached by the four Powers of Russia, Britain,
Prussia, and Austria.
( 2 )
The Treaty of London concluded in July 1840 embodied
this agreement. Article I stated that the contracting Powers
had come to an agreement with Turkey as to what terms Mehemet
Ali should receive; and Article II declared that in case
Mehemet refused to accept them, they, the Powers, would under-
take to force him to do so.
Articles III and IV were fundamental in the history
of the Straits and ran:-
* Article III. If Mehemet Ali, after having refused
to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned,
should direct his land or sea forces against Constant inople
,
the high contracting Powers, upon the express demand of the
Sultan, addressed to their representatives at Constantinople,
agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that
Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by
(1) Prance due to her interest in Egypt was carrying on
secret negotiations with the Sublime Porte.
(2) Boradounghian Yol. II, pp, 303 seq.
..
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means of cooperation agreed upon by mutual consent , for the
purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphortyus and
Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman Empire,
in security against all aggression.
»It is further agreed that the forces which, in virtue
of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain
so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the
Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no
longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously with-
draw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediter-
ranean respectively.
* Article IV. It is, however, expressly understood,
that the cooperation mentioned in the preceding Article, and
destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the
Bosphor^us, and the Ottoman capital, under the temporary safe-
guard of the high contracting parties against all aggression
of Mehemet Ali
,
shall be considered only as a measure of excep-
tion adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely
for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is
agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree
from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of
which it has in all times been prohibited for ships of war of
foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of
the Bosphor\»us. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby
declares that, excepting the contingency above mentioned, it
is his firm resolution to maintain in future this prinsiple
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invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire; and
as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of
war into the Straits of the Bosphor^us and of the Dardanelles;
on the other hand, their Majesties the Q,ueen of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria,
King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the
Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determina-
tion of the Sultan, and to conform to the above mentioned
principle.
By a protocol which v/as afterwards incorporated in
the Convention of 1841, the Ottoman plenipotentiary reserved
to the Porte the right to deliver passes to light vessels
under a flag of war which could be employed according to
custom for the service of the correspondence of the legations
of friendly Powers.
By this treaty the considerable advantages which Russia
had derived from the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi were cancelled.
The Tsar would undoubtedly have hesitated to enter into such
a transaction had he not been at the time animated with hatred
for the July monarchy. However, the real significance of the
Treaty of London is that it translates into European public
law a principle which had previously been recognized only in
the dealings of individual Powers with Turkey. The "ancient
rule of the Ottoman Empire" was formulated by the Sultan towards
the end of the eighteenth century as principle of Turkish public
administration, but now "four of the leading Powers of Europe
.'
jointly recognize in a formal int ernat ional instrument the
applicability of the rule of closing the Bosphorfyus and the
Dardanelles to warships of all States, while the Sultan,
engaging to observe this rule in general, formally surrenders
(i)
his former right of opening the Straits at discretion. H
The next year a still further step was taken by extend-
ing the recognition of the rule and at the same time widening
and so reinforcing the obligation of the Porte. Prance signed
a general treaty recognizing the obligation of the Sultan
to close the Straits to foreign warships in time of peace.
This Convention of the Straits was accepted by other Powers
later, and became a general rule of European international
law. Its provisions are very brief and clear, consisting
of the following three articles and an additional one dealing
with ratifications:
’Article I. His Highness the Sultan, on the one
part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for
the future the principle invariably established as the ancient
rule of the Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times
been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to
enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphor^us; and
that so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit
no Poreign Ship of Y/ar into the said Straits.
’And their Majesties the Q,ueen of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King
(l) Phillipson and Buxton p. 77

of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King
of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other
part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan and
to conform themselves to the principle above declared.
’Article II. It is understood that in recording the
inviolability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire
mentioned in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves to
himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage to
light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed as
is usual in the service of the missions of foreign Powers.
’Article III. His Highness the Sultan reserves to
himself to communicate the present Convention to all the
Powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friend-
(i)
ship, inviting them to accede thereto.’
This Convention, reaffirmed in its essentials in the
Treaty of Paris in 1856, and again in the Treaty of London
in 1871, was the fundamental document in the international
law of the Straits down to the World War. It robbed Russia
of its predominance in Turkish affairs and hence led the Tsar
Hicholas to make use of the theory of the ’’sick man of Europe
whose inheritance should be divided among the Powers. The
first step toward this end showed that the heirs could not
agree, and the quarrel over the spoils began. It was not for
the control of the Straits that they now fought, but for the
rights of Russia as the protector of the Orthodox clergy and
(l) Shotwell pp. 510-511
i •
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of France as the ancient champion of Catholicism in the
East at the holy places in the Sultan* s realm. Russia fin-
ally, unahle to secure full privileges from the Porte, took
natters into her own hands and invaded Turkey in 1853. She
claimed that she was not at war for material gain "but that
she had been forced to take the defensive side against Turkey
who was trying to drive the Russians from Ottoman soil.
The action of Russia at once involved France, since
Napoleon III was strongly committed to a clerical policy, and
England, as the traditional protector of the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, was drawn into common action with France. The
British and French fleets entered the Sea of Marmora justify-
ing this act hy the Straits Convention. Russia claimed that,
under pretext of saving Turkey, they had openly violated the
Convention. After concluding a treaty of alliance with Turkey,
France and England declared war on Russia. This was known as
the Crimean War since it was fought out on the Crimea, hy the
aid of the allied fleets which struck at the great Russian
fortress on the Black Sea, Sebastopol.
The peace negotiations were begun before the Crimean
War was finished. The allied Powers laid down the funda-
mental conditions demanded by them in the form of ’four points*.
These were: 1. the abolition of the Russian protectorate over
the Danubian principalities; 2. the free navigation of the
Danube; 3. the neutralization of the Black Sea; and 4. the
position of the Christians of Turkey. The third, involving a
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revision of the treaty of 1841, was the most difficult question
to settle. It was to be expected that after a disastrous war,
Russia would surrender the position it had held, with refer-
ence to Turkey, but to accept the full humiliation of a neu-
tralized sea on its southern frontier was to accept the terms
of the vanquished. This it was forced to do after the fall
of Sebastopol.
The Conference at Paris of the Powers of Europe (in-
.
(i)
eluding Sardinia) drew up the Treaty of Paris in 1856 which
for the next fourteen years determined the status of the
Straits. A separate Convention between the six Powers and
the Sultan, signed at the same time as the Treaty and at-
tached to it by Article X reaffirmed textually the clauses
of the proposals in the Treaty concerning the control of the
navigation of the Danube, by which each of the Powers was
permitted to send through the Straits two light vessels of
war for service off the mouth of the Danube. Otherwise the
Convention which regulated the regime of the Straits in 1856
merely reenacted the Convention of 1841.
The most significant work of the Conference at Paris
was the neutralization of the Black Sea, an attempt to fore-
stall future complications in the Hear East by imposing a
sweeping prohibition on Russian preparedness. Russia was to
be denied not only a fleet on its southern coastal waters but
even arsenals along its shores. The clauses dealing with this
matter rans-
(l) Hertslet Map of Europe - Vol. II, p. 1250

46
.
’Article XI. The Black Sea is neutralized, its v/aters
and its ports thrown open to the mercantile marine of every
nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag
of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any
other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV
and XIX of the present treaty.
’Article XII. Free from any impediment, the commerce
in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject
only to regulations of health, customs and police, framed in
a spirit favorable to the development of commercial transac-
tions.
’In order to afford to the commercial and maritime
interests of every nation the security which is desired,
Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit consuls into their
ports situated upon the coast of the Black Sea, in conformity
with the principles of international law.
’Article XIII. The Black Sea being neutralized ac-
cording to the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or estab-
lishment upon its coast of military-maritime arsenals becomes
alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty
the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the
Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that
coast any military-maritime arsenal.
’Article XIV. Their Majesties the Emperor of All the
Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the
purpose of settling the force and the number of light vessels,
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necessary for the service of their coasts, which they -reserve
to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention
is annexed to the present treaty, and shall have the same
force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof.
It cannot he either annulled or modified without the assent
of the Powers signing the present treaty.
*
On the proposal of Austria a convention was signed at
Paris, in April, between Great Britain, France, and Austria,
for the purpose of insuring the independence and integrity
of the Ottoman Empire by means of their joint and several
guarantee. It was agreed that any infraction of the stipu-
lations of the Treaty of Paris would be considered by the
signatories as a cause for war. Russia is not mentioned, but
it is obvious that it was directed against her; for it was
Great Britain’s policy to prevent the Tsar from becoming
master of the Straits and so endangering British interests
in the East; and it was the object of Austria to prevent the
Tsar from occupying the Danubian Principalities. Russia’s
position after the settlement, therefore, was a most disad-
vantageous one. Before the Russian expansion under Peter the
Great and Catherine II the Black Sea was a Turkish lake.
After the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi it became virtually a
Russian lake. How, the Treat}/- of Paris made it a European
Sea, and placed it under the express sanction of the Powers.
To the existing notions of free sea and territorial sea - "mare
liberum” or "apertum”, and "mare clausum" - a new conception
.;
*
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was added, viz. that of a neutralized sea, thus the principle
of continental neutralization, adopted in the interests of
political equilibrium, was applied to a maritime sphere with
(i)
the same object.
During this era there was evident in Europe a pronounced
nationalistic spirit. The age of Italy’s and Germany’s uni-
fication, and of England’s world wide development, could not
well leave Russia, suffering the constant sense of humiliation
in the limitation upon her power of defense along the whole
southern frontier. Alexander II, although chagrined by this
constant reminder of defeat, steadily refused to bring up
the question of the revision of the Treaty of Paris so long
as the proposition was likely to bring another war. Prance
approached Russia with the idea in 1858 before the war with
Austria, who did likewise after the war in 1859, and again
in 1867. William I of Prussia approached her also in 1866
after the Seven Weeks War. Always Alexander refused to act.
His patience was rewarded by 1870 when the Pranco-Prussian
war offered a chance for Russia to recover what she had lost,
since western Europe was too much preoccupied with its own
affairs to interfere.
Bismarck’s assent to Russia’s denunciation of the
objectionable terms of the Treaty of Paris was easily won,
and the other signatories not being in a position to make war,
Gortchakov issued his famous circular dispatch in October 1870.
(l) Phillipson and Buxton p. 99
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In it he protested that fifteen years* experience had proved
false the assumptions in the Treaty of Paris that neutraliza-
tion of the Black Sea would safeguard the peace of all inter-
ested. In truth, while Russia disarmed in the Black Sea,
Turkey maintained unlimited naval forces in the Aegean and
Straits, and France and England could mobilize their fleets
in the Mediterranean. There was, so he claimed, a contradic-
tion between the treaty itself and the Convention of the
Straits attached to it; since the former forbade warships to
sail the Black Sea at any time, while the latter prohibited
them from passing the Straits into the Black Sea only in time
of peace. This, he said, exposed Russia to coastal attacks
from less powerful states, while she was unprepared. More-
over, he claimed that in the interim the treaty had been modi-
fied with reference to Moldavia and Vallachia; infractions had
occurred in that **whole squadrons** of foreign warships had
(i)
been admitted to the Black Sea. The danger for Russia thus
increased. Therefore, a treaty thus violated had no longer
binding force, and Russian security could no longer be allowed
to depend on a fiction that failed to stand the test of time.
Accordingly, Russia, considering her safety and dignity, was
forced to withdraw from the treaty in question, and, '*in the
interests of peace, was prepared to come to an under standing
(l) ***In 1871 a return laid before Parliament showed that the
number of foreign ships of War which had passed the Straits
were: In 1862, 1 British; in 1866, 1 American; in 1868,
1 American, 2 Austrian, 1 French, 1 Russian; in 1869, 1
Prussian. It also appeared that in seven other instances,
questions had arisen with regard to the passage of Foreign
Ships of War through the Straits, but that in no case had a
violation of treaty been shown to have taken place,**’
Footnote in Shotwell **A Short History of the Straits'*
Quoted by him from Hertslet III, p. 1895
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with the Powers for the puroose of establishing a just and
(i)
equitable arrangement on a more solid foundation.” The note
concluded with the statement that the Tsar did not wish to
revive the Eastern Question, and adhered to the general
principles of 1856 which fixed the position of Turkey in the
European system.
In addition to the circular, a special despatch, con-
taining appropriate comments, was sent to each signatory Power.
England protested to Gortchakov's note at once through
Lord Granville, Foreign Minister, who claimed that no one
signatory could thus release itself from its obligations but
that such a right belonged only to all the governments who
had been party to the original instrument. The British Govern-
ment was thus not objecting to a consideration of a revision
of the Treaty of Paris. What it questioned was the right of
one party to a treaty to declare it void when it no longer
suited its convenience. The Russian claim, if admitted as a
precedent, might undermine the whole structure of international
lav/ by reducing treaties to mere "scraps of paper".
France, Austria, and Turkey, also objected to a unilat-
eral renunciation.
Italy did not oppose a revision of the treaty, provided
that the Turkish Empire remained intact.
_ ( 2 )
According to Gonainow, opinion in the United States
was on the side of Russia. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State,
(1) Phillipson and Buxton - p. 107
(2) This fact rests wholly on the despatches of Catacazy who
was known as one whose word was not to be trusted.
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informed Catacazy, the Russian minister at 7/ashington, that
the American government had never recognized the Treaty of
Paris; and suggested the conclusion of an alliance "between
the two Powers, if Russia would support the United States in
the Alabama affair.
Negotiations were, however, soon begun for arranging
a Conference of the Powers concerned. London was agreed upon
as the place of meeting.
Bismarck agreed to take part provided the Franco-Prussian
question was not introduced. Turkey consented to participate
on condition that the negotiations be confined to those pro-
visions of the Treaty of Paris that Russia found objectionable.
Russia 7/as desirous that the Conference would concern itself
only with her complaints in regard to the stipulations that
affected her security, dignity, and honor.
After much negotiation relative to the order and form
of proceedings to be observed at the Conference, the first
meeting was held in January 1871. Lord Granville began busi-
ness by securing a declaration on the inviolability of treaties.
After several failures to secure a statement that 7/as
(i)
acceptable to all, the Treaty of London was finally accepted
March 13, 1871. The articles relating to the Straits and the
Black Sea were:-
'Article I. Articles XI, XIII, XIV of the Treaty of
Paris of the 30th March, 1856, as well as the special conven-
tion concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and
(l) Hertslet "Map of Europe" Vol. Ill, p. 1919
.. c
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annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated, and replaced
by the following article.
’Article II. The principle of the closing of Straits
of the Dardanelles and the Bosphor^us, such as it has been
established by the separate convention of the 30th March, 1856,
is maintained, with power to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan
to open the said Straits in time of peace to vessels of war of
friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should
judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the
stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856.
’./Article III. The Black Sea remains open, as hereto-
fore, to the mercantile marine of all nations.
’Article VIII. The high contracting parties renew and
confirm all stipulations of the Treaty of the 30th March, 1856,
as well as of its annexes, -which are not annulled or modified
by the present treaty.
’
(i)
A separate convention between Russia and Turkey stated:-
’ Article I. The special convention concluded at Paris
between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan on the 18/30th March, 1856, rela-
tive to the number and force of the vessels of war of the two
high contracting parties in the Black Sea, is and remains
abrogated.
’
The Treaty of London enabled Russia to build and main-
tain a fleet in the Black Sea, to restore the fortifications
(l) Hertslet "Map of Europe" Vol. Ill, p. 1924
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of Sevastopol, and so to "be in a position to become once
again a menace to Const ant inople . The rule as to closing the
Straits was left as under the treaties of 1841 and 1856. The
Sultan’s power to open them was enlarged: before 1871 he was
not allowed, as long as he was at peace, to admit foreign war-
ships; by the Treaty of London he was permitted to open them
to warships of friendly Governments if he thought it necessary
in order to preserve the unrevoked articles of 1856. This
treaty remained in force until the Y/orld War,
tL
CHAPT.a5l VI
From The Treaty of London
To The Treaty of Berlin
We have just seen that hy the Treaty of London the
Russians were allowed to maintain warships in the Black Sea,
while the Turks were allowed to open the Straits in peace as
well as in war to allied and friendly Powers. This permission
( 1 ) ( 2 )
as well as Articles VII and IX of the Treaty of Paris were
abused by the Turks.
The situation of the Christians and especially of the
Slavs grew worse and worse until in 1875 it was evident that
a crisis of some sort must be faced. In the summer of that
year a revolt in an obscure village of Herzegovina (southern
Bosnia) seemed at the outset to be merely an internal affair
of Turkey but proved to be a movement that spread all over
the Balkan peninsula, leading to a war involving Russia as
well as the Balkans and ending in an important int ernat ional
congress. The corruption of the Turkish Government and the
overweeningness of the landed class led to this and subse-
quent risings in Bosnia.
At approximately this same time the Porte was forced
to anger the French, German, British, and Hebraic financial
world by refusing to pay all the interest on its swollen
public debt.
Germany, Russia, and Austria under Bismarck formed a
loose alliance and in 1876 presented to the Porte a demand
(1) By Article VII of the Treaty of Paris the territorial
integrity of Turkey was guaranteed by all the other
combajAtant Powers and also by Austria and Prussia.
(2) Article IX stated the Sultan T s good intentions toward
his Christian subjects.
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( 1 )
reform known as the "Andrassy Note", gaining its name from
its reputed author, the Austrian Chancellor. The Porte ac-
cepted it, hut in the usual manner of the Ottoman Government
failed to act according to the agreement.
In the following year England’s stand was the deciding
factor in the diplomatic movements of the other Powers. France
could not adventure in this direction since she had not recov-
ered from her troubles of 1870. Germany was attempting the
impossible in trying to keep general peace and at the same
time hold the friendship of both Russia and Austria. Tsar
Alexander II of Russia unquestionably wanted to avoid war al-
though he had to deal with the Pan-Slavist movement, the
religious tie, and the officials who felt that this was an
opportunity to redeem the humiliation of the Crimean War. His
ministers presently thought that they could reach an under-
standing with Austria which would save them from a repetition
of the disasters of the 1850’s.
England remained. She was now under the premiership
of Disraeli whose sympathies very evidently lay with Turkey.
In his speeches he tended to ignore or apologize for the
shortcomings of the Porte. Consequently the Turks counting
on British support continued along the same line of action.
Since the ’’Andrassy Note'’ had no definite results and
the insurrection in Bosnia threatened to spread, the same
three nations, Germany, Austria, and Russia, presented the
(l) Great Britain gave the note its general adhesion.
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Porte with the Berlin memorandum, which proposed an armistice
and a mixed commission, adding that the Christians should he
allowed to retain their arms, and that the Turkish troops
should he concentrated. In other words they specifically
stated their demands. France and Italy gave their adhesion
to the document, hut the government of Great Britain ostenta-
tiously declined. ”A British fleet even rode off the Darda-
a)
nelles as if to give support to the Porte against Russia.”
The result of these diplomatic maneuvers was inevitable.
The situation became increasingly unbearable, and war was de-
clared at first by Serbia and then by Montenegro.
Bulgaria was the next in line to be aroused by Ottoman
misrule. She had already shown since 1856 a decided tendency
towards the development of a sense of nationality, and now
when Serbia and Montenegro took up arms to assist their op-
pressed brothers in Bosnia, there was a stir in many of the
Bulgarian villages leading to a series of revolts that were
answered by savage reprisals known as the "Bulgarian atrocities”.
Wholesale massacres, and acts of lust and perfidy drew Russian
indignation to a high peak, since she always considered her-
self the protector of Orthodox Christians and the smaller
Slavic states.
The defeat of the Serbian forces and the Turkish reac-
tion to the Bulgarian insurrect ions brought matters to the
point of eruption which stayed the Turkish advance in the
(l) Davis, William Stearns "A Short History of the Hear East”
p. 332. Davis is the only one to mention this fact. If
true, it is important since it shows the extent to which
the British government was opposed to Russia.
ii
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Balkans. Russia, in November 1876, issued an ultimatum to
Turkey demanding an armistice within forty-eight hours or war
with the Tsar. The Porte accepted the proposed armistice.
In the meantime the horrible acts of the Turks were
a)
forcing from them their lone friend, England. Although Disraeli
and the Tories tried to minimize the reports of these barbaric
deeds, the country was aroused by newspaper accounts and in the
main by Gladstone’s appearance in public life once more. This
opponent of Disraeli left his theological studies to write his
famous pamphlet on the "Bulgarian Horrors" which stirred the
English temper to the point of anger so that the Eoreign Secre-
tary was forced to telegraph to Constantinople that "’any renewal
of such outrages would prove more disastrous to the Porte than the
( 2 )
loss of a battle’" and that "’any sympathy previously felt --
had been completely destroyed by the lamentable occurrences in
(3)
Bulgaria’". Thus the English policy turned from one of ex-
treme favoritism of Turkey to one of confusion. Lord Beacons-
field, as Prime Minister, and the Queen, felt that the Eastern
Question was a duel between Russia and England. It was impos-
sible for Great Britain as a European nation to oppose Russia’s
desire to improve the condition of Turkey’s Christian subjects,
but Beaconsfield and the Queen were one in the opinion that Russia’
real aim was the destruction of the Turkish Empire and her own
(1) Disraeli - Letter to Lady Bradford - "Everything has gone
against us - but nothing so much as the "Bulgarian Atroci-
ties" which changed the bent of opinion in England as regards
Turkey ". Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and
Lady Bradford, p. 84
(2) Miller, William "The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors" p. 365
(3) Davis, 'William Stearns "A Short History of the Near East
330 - 1922 A. D." p. 334
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aggrandizement through the acquisition of Constantinople and
the Straits which meant to them the "key to India'*. It was
this policy that they felt duty hound to oppose. Alexander
assured the British Ambassador that he had no such intentions.
Derby, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs adop-
ted the lazy man’s policy of peace and lai sser-faire ; while
Salisbury felt that a new and permanent solution could be
a)
found in a partition of Turkey.
As a last resort in the latter part of 1876 a confer-
ence of the Powers was called at Constantinople to find a way
in which the Balkan troubles might be ended and the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire be kept intact but this attempt failed
because of Turkey’s attitude. First of all the new Padishah
bestowed upon his people a liberal constitution and informed
the Powers that they must refrain from action until his
Parliament could meet and enact specific laws correcting the
objectionable wrongs in the Balkans. The plenipotentiaries
of Europe paid little attention to this act but went ahead
and formulated their demands which were refused by the Porte.
The conference broke up, but one last appeal was made by a
fresh conference held in London. Here the Powers signed the
"London Protocol" but this too was rejected and war was
inevitable. It broke out in 1877.
(l) In a letter to Lord Lytton in 1877 he thus expressed this
idea - "I feel convinced that the old policy - wise enough
in its time - of defending English interests by sustaining
the Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable, and I think
the time has come for defending English interests in a
more direct way by some territorial re-arrangement.
Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury by Lady Cecil p. 130
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Alexander II of Russia had "begun his preparations since
the serving of the ultimatum in the fall of 1876. His first
moves had "been to secure the neutrality of Austria and Germany.
The former necessitated two secret conventions which assured
her neutrality so long as Russia did not overstep certain re-
(i)
strictions laid down "by Count Andrassy.
Since the relations between the Emperor of Germany and
his nephew the Tsar of Russia were friendly, and since Bismarck
maintained a public policy of neutrality but privately encour-
aged Russia, it was with little difficulty that Russia gained
a promise of neutrality from her.
As for the rest of Europe Gortchakov, the Russian Chan-
cellor, had tried to make it evident in a circular of January
that Russia would undertake a war only as the mandatory of
Europe and to avenge the wrongs of the Christians. Since the
Porte had failed to respond to the "London Protocol", Gortchakov
published another circular in April explaining the necessity
of war thus hoping to secure the neutrality and possibly to
gain the approval of Europe in her humanitarian mission. Lord
Beaconsfield proposed to declare to Russia what interests Great
Britain would be ready to defend if she thought them menaced,
and at the same time to seize some place in the East, the
Dardanelles or some other point, and hold it as a guarantee
of Russia’s good behavior. To do this it was necessary to
(l) Lee, Dwight Erwin - British Policy in the Eastern Question
1878 - Dissertation - Harvard University - 1928 "He stip-
ulated that Russia in her military operations should respect
a neutral zone comprised of Serbia, Montenegro, and the
lands between the two, and he further bound her regarding
the territorial changes that might follow the war."
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have Turkey ’s consent, which meant an alliance with her; or to
have Russian agreement concerning opposition to Turkey; or to
act independently in opposition to Turkey without the agree-
ment of Russia. Few in the country would agree to an alliance
with Turkey; Beaconsfield and the Q,ueen would not give ear to
the second alternative, and the third was considered too dan-
gerous since it appeared too much like a grab of territory.
The occupation of the Straits by Great Britain would most
probably lead to riots in Const ant inople and necessitate inter-
ference. If Russia reached Constant inople she would try to
oust the British.
Furthermore, any move that Great Britain might safely
take in the Straits required the neutrality of the other
Medit erranean Powers. The Italian ministers implied that
their country would offer no resistance to British action in
the Straits but the attitude of Prance was quite different.
Lord Lyons, the British .Ambassador, at Paris, stated that
Prance would be unwilling to offend Russia, and that in the
question of the Straits she could not be counted upon to aid
England in resisting Russian aims and desires.
The policy finally adopted by Great Britain was one of
compromise. The Cabinet decided to declare their views of the
Russian declaration of war and to define their interests. Two
notes of May 1st and May 6th embodied the policy which England
followed until the end of the war. The first of these des-
patches was addressed to Lord Loftus, British Ambassador to
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Russia, in answer to Gortchakov’s Circular of April 19, and
showed plainly that Great Britain would not acquiesce in a
Russian settlement of the Eastern Question.
The second note wras addressed to Count Shuvalov, the
Russian .Ambassador to England. It made clear the danger
points which Russia would be wise to avoid. The vital points
of Constantinople and the Straits were treated with firmness.
In regard to the former, the British Government was "not pre-
pared to witness with indifference the passing into other
hands than those of its present possessors, of a capital hold-
(l)
ing so peculiar and commanding a position". They regarded
the existing laws regulating the navigation of the Straits as
( 2 )
"wise and salutary" and objected to their alteration "in any
(3)
material particular".
Shuvalov made it his business to gain information re-
garding the secrets of the foreign office and as soon as he
learned Beaconsf i eld’s attitude toward the Russian war, he
began to urge his government to come to an understanding with
England regarding the points of interest which might cause
%
British interference. He argued that unless an agreement was
reached, Russian successes would excite England to the point
of making decisions that might lead to a conflict. Shuvalov’s
plan, being the natural complement of the Russian policy
toward Austria and Germany, was adopted. Gortchakov wished
to extend it to include Austria and thus promote an agreement
(1) Lee, Dwight Erwin "British Policy in the Eastern Question
1878" p. 21
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
•*
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"between the three Powers most directly concerned in the peace
settlement
.
In her formal acceptance of Britain’s restrictions,
Russia repeated her assurances concerning Constantinople, af-
firming that its acquisition was not a part of the Tsar’s aims,
that its fate was a common interest which could be regulated
only by a general understanding and that if the possession of
the city should be a matter of doubt it should go to none of
the European Powers. The question of the Straits was to be
likewise settled by a common accord on the basis of equitable
and effective guarantees; but if victorious, Russia could not
be expected not to wish to change the existing agreements.
However, any modification of them would be settled by common
agreement among the Powers. Concerning the final peace, the
English insistence upon the maintenance of the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire v/as not irreconcilable with the Russian
demand for betterment of conditions for the Orthodox Christians.
Russia did her part in stating the terms she would accept be-
fore crossing the Balkans, and if Turkey refused to accept
these terms, Russia would be compelled to continue the v/ar.
The peace then concluded would depend upon events of the future
but would be made with the assent of the Powers if they re-
mained neutral; and neutrality in the opinion of the Russian
Government would not permit Great Britain to occupy Constantinople
or the Dardanelles.
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Bismarck’s ideas on the solution of the Eastern Question
were important and came to light in May. In general, he felt
that England’s' note of May 6th would furnish a basis upon which
the war could be localized and a lasting peace made. There
were only two points of interest, he said, over which Russia
and England could conflict with each other and those were:
Constantinople and the navigation of the Bosphorous and Darda-
nelles. However, Shuvalov had told Bismarck that if Russia were
victorious on the North side of the Balkans after crossing the
Danube, a first attempt would be made at an armistice and peace
negotiations. To that Bismarck gladly gave his support, but
in case the first attempts failed, Bismarck thought that a
second attempt should be made before the Russians reached Con-
stantinople. But, if this too failed, and they marched on
Constantinople, further localization would become problematical
and the peace of Europe doubtful. Therefore, Bismarck hoped
that the warning of Great Britain to St. Petersburg would be
followed by an English occupation of the Dardanelles, "the
effect of which would be to arrest the advance of the Russians
on Constantinople and to facilitate peace negotiations before
u)
further localization of the war became impossible
!
r
.
Bisrnar ck^sserted that he was in favor of any settle-
ment leading to a lasting peace and stated that neither Austria
nor Germany could object to a modification of the Straits arrange-
ment although other Powers might do so.
(l) Lee, Dwight Erwin "British Policy in the Eastern Question
1878" p. 26
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Upon one point Bismarck’s policy was not quite clear.
He advised England to seize the Dardanelles, while a month
later he believed that it was best for England not to attempt
it for fear of encouraging the Turks. It is possible that he
hoped that the immediate seizure of the Straits would commit
England to the partition of Turkey which he had urged and still
continued to urge. Or perhaps he had suggested to Shuvalov
that, in view of the agitation in England for some material
guarantee, he ought to persuade his government to acquiesce to
an English occupation of the Straits as a concession to English
sensitiveness. The refusal of Russia to permit such action by
England may have caused the German premier to change his views.
Although there is no evidence that such was the case, the effect
of his hint to take the Dardanelles was disastrous. It appeared
very much like intrigue, since at this time it was asserted
from all sides that an intimate understanding existed between
the Three Powers. Such an obvious effort to strengthen
Shuvalov’s hand miscarried, for only the Q,ueen, under the in-
fluence of the British Ambassador at Germany, Lord Russell,
favored the idea of trying to carry Bismarck with England in
the negotiations with Russia. Ho action, therefore, was taken
on the part of England in answer to Bismarck’s suggestion
except that Beaconsfield sent word to Bismarck by Russell early
in July that England counted upon the support of Germany in
maintaining the sovereignty of the Sultan and the principles which
regulated the navigation of the Bosphor^us and the Dardanelles.
.-
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Meanwhile Russia was busy at Rome and Paris with a plan
for securing an agreement in regard to the final settlement.
There was no doubt but that the opening of the Dardanelles
would be the only delicate and difficult question likely to
be included in the Russian terms of peace. All were anxious
to mediate before Russia crossed the Danube so that as much
of Turkey as possible might be kept safe. But any terms sug-
gested by Russia were considered far from moderate and England
felt that their negotiations with Russia were part of a trap
to keep the British quiet and to let Russia do as she wished.
Consequently when it was reported from Layard at St. Petersburg
that the Russian press was urging the free passage of the
Straits and that the Russians were within two days’ march from
Adrianople, Lord Beaconsfield urged Parliament to send an ex-
pedition to Gallipoli to secure the Dardanelles. His demand
was not heeded, however, because the Russians, unsuccessful
in the Black Sea where the Turkish fleet was vastly superior,
had been stopped at Plevna after a series of land victories
in the Balkans. Rumania now joined Russia, and, in December,
Plevna fell, and the Russians arrived in Adrianople. Immedi-
ately the Sultan appealed to England who now feared that the
Dardanelles might fall under Russian control. The British
fleet consequently advanced to the Sea of Marmora to wait
outside the Straits for any move on the part of the Slavs
towards Constantinople
..
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The results of all these diplomatic maneuvers amounted
to nought as far as ending the war and settling the matter of
the Straits were concerned, because Russia refused to make a
pledge concerning the Dardanelles, and, therefore, England’s
policy continued to be one of conditional and vigilant neutrality.
England turned now to Austria in an attempt to come to
an agreement and to get her to sign a protocol. She argued that
Austrian cooperation was necessary to keep the peace, for by it
the Russians could be prevented from going to Constantinople.
But Andrassy refused to sign a protocol because he said he had
told Russia that he would not act dishonestly toward her by
entering an agreement with a third power. He recommended that
each Power should maintain its interests by diplomatic means
as need should arise, without calling on the other Power. But
if any one of their mutual interests should be endangered, they
could then come to an understanding concerning the combined
action they should take.
Both Derby and Andrassy made it very clear that any
Russian occupation of the Straits and permanent occupation of
Constant inople would be considered just causes for v/ar.
Although there was no signed agreement made between
Austria and England, these negotiations, when considered along
with the Anglo-Russian exchanges, resulted practically in the
three power agreement that Gortchakov had been seeking. They
also showed Russia that the time had not yet come for her to
control the long coveted Dardanelles. The failure of England
..
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to gain Austria as an active ally served to prove that Andrassy
was under some one else*s influence - that of Bismarck. In the
midst of the siege of Plevna, the Turks had asked for mediation
and now, on the last day of January 1878, at Adrianople, an
armistice was concluded, in the last article of which the Porte
agreed to safeguard the rights and interests of Russia in the
,
(1)
"Detroit s du Bosphore et des Dardanelles”.
Neither Great Britain nor Austria liked the conditions
of the Armistice, and Greece complicated the situation hy de-
claring war on Turkey in February, but a united protest of the
Powers squelched this move. It was evident that a European
Conference was necessary to make a definite end to the war.
Andrassy of Austria suggested a meeting at Vienna, and though
Gortchakov agreed, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty of San
Stefano on March 3rd regardless of the interests of the other
Powers. The large indemnity demanded, the territorial and
governmental changes in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Roumania, Serbia,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina if fulfilled would have practically
excluded Turkey from Europe. Article XXIII renewed all treaties
between the two parties while Article XXIV of the treaty
directly concerned the Straits: "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles
resteront ouverts, en temps de guerre come en temps de paix,
aux navires marchands des Etats neutres, arrivant des ports
russes ou en destination de ces ports. La Sublime Porte
s' engage en consequence a ne plus etablir dorenavant, devant
(l) Noradounghian Vol. Ill, p. 507
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.
\es ports de la mer Noire et de celle d'Azow, un blocus fictif
jui s l £carterait de 1* esprit de la Declaration signee a Paris
a)
le 4-16 Avril 1856".
'.Then England and Austria learned of the terms of the
Treaty of San Stefano they both prepared for war. On April 1st
Lord Salisbury, who was now at the helm of the Foreign Office,
issued a circular denouncing the treaty because it conflicted
with British interests, contradicted existing international
agreements and declarations, and gave Russia an undue prepon-
derance in the East. He added that England would not take
part in the proposed congress unless the entire Treaty of San
Stefano be submitted for discussion. Russia refused to be
humbled and commanded by Britain but agreed that all questions
raised should be discussed provided she was not summoned before
a Congress whose decisions she was bound to accept.
Bismarck formulated the plan for the Congress and pro-
posed to the Powers Y/ho had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871
that they discuss the Treaty of San Stefano. Shuvalov having
stated that the Tsar had no intention of extending his con-
quests in Asia beyond Batoum and Kars, and in Europe beyond
those limits prescribed by the treaty under discussion, England
agreed not to contest these acquisitions. ^Thereupon Salisbury
and Shuvalov signed three memoranda: the first defined the
territorial changes accepted by Great Britain; the second,
among other matters, reserved to the British Government the
right to discuss at the Congress all questions touching the
(l) Noradounghian Vol. Ill, p. 519
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Straits and declared that Russia agreed to accept the status
quo in regard to the Straits thereby renouncing the claim for
the passage of the Straits by her warships. The third memoran-
dum contained the word of Shuvalov as to the limits of Russian
acquisitions under the Treaty of San Stefano.
Previous to the meeting of the Congress England and
Turkey entered into a secret alliance by which England agreed
to protect the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan if Russia acquired
Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, while the Porte promised to introduce
reforms into Asia Minor and to allow Great Britain to occupy
and administer Cyprus.
The Congress convened on June 13th at Berlin and sat
for one month. In the twenty sittings held there were many
(i)
long and arduous debates in which Russia and England always
conflicted. In fact it was the age old stand in the Eastern
Question: Russia against the rest of Europe which feared her
control of the Straits. Austria naturally sided with England,
Prance and Italy usually did, while Germany, much to Gortchakov’s
surprise, turned from Russia and nearly always sided with England.
Russia was astounded and henceforth spoke of 'her ”humiliat i on
( 2 )
by Bismarck”. An agreement was finally concluded and embodied
in the Treaty of Berlin on July 13th which thoroughly trans-
formed the Treaty of San Stefano.
(l) England’s attitude was exemplified by Salisbury in a let-
ter to Lord Russell in the spring of 1878, in which he
said - "'Je object to Russia under the mask either of Slav
or Turk dominating on the coasts, , where we have
now friends, clients, and interests.”
from "Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury Hby Lady Cecil
p • 239
Ludwig, Emil "Bismarck” p. 521( 2 )
.*.
.
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The greater part of the treaty dealt with the Balkans
situation but Article 63 concerned the Dardanelles and it did
nothing more than confirm the status quo as set forth in the
Treaty of Paris of 1856 and that of London in 1871.
Thus all the diplomatic maneuvers were futile, for
matters concerning the Dardanelles remained in the same unsat-
isfactory state which all Europe realized was temporary. The
question was important enough at this time to be listed as
one of the main causes for the Russo-Turkish war because
Turkey never would have had the courage to bear arms against
Russia if she did not have the support of England, who favored
the Turk because she feared for her trade to India if Russia
gained control of the Straits. The last mentioned country
doubtlessly was aiming at modifying the rule of the Straits
so that foreign warships would be excluded therefrom, while
she would be able to secure the passage of her own warships
by means of an arrangement with the Sultan. Consequently
her reaction to the unrest in the Balkans was supported by
national, as well as racial and religious aims.

CHAPTER VII
From the Treaty of Berlin
Through the World War
The twenty years following the Treaty of Berlin were
marked hy no obvious interest in the question of the Straits
by any of the European countries. However, that it was con-
stantly in the minds of all the statesmen is evident from the
insertion of it into several agreements between nations in
the next two decades.
In 1881, Russia, Austria, and Germany signed a treaty
forming the League of the Three Emperors, which was to consoli-
date the general peace of Europe. In Article III, the three
countries reaffirmed the principle of the closing of the Strait
It read thus: "The three Courts recognize the European and
mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing
of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, founded
on internet ional law, confirmed by treaties, and summed up in
the declaration of the second Plenipotent iary of Russia at the
session of July 12 of the Congress of Berlin.
They will take care in common that Turkey shall make
no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any
Government whatsoever, by lending to warlike operations of a
belligerent Power the portion of its Empire constituted by the
Straits.
In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such in-
fringement should be in prospect, the three Courts will inform
Turkey that they would regard her, in that event, as putting
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herself in a state of war towards the injured Party, and as
having deprived herself thenceforth of the benefits of the
security assured to her territorial status quo by the Treaty
a)
of Berlin.” This treaty was renewed in 1884.
The Dreikaiserbund expired in 1887 and Alexander III,
due to trouble in the Balkans between Austria and Russia,
refused to renew it. However, Bismarck was anxious to keep
in touch with Russia and signed a secret treaty known as the
( 2 )
Reinsurance Treaty. In Article III the two countries repeated
Article III of the treaty of 1881 between Russia, Austria,
and Germany.
In January, 1883, was founded the Triple Alliance of
Germany, Austria and Italy, which was renewed on March 13, 1887
To this renewal there v/as added a secret annex v/hich included
among its eight points the recognition of the “Independence of
Turkey, trustee of important European interests ( independence
of the Caliphate, freedom of the Straits, etc.) of all prepon-
derating foreign influence".
(4)
It is to be noted that up to this time, Germany having
no vital interest in the Straits, had paid little attention
(5)
to the question. Bismarck had allowed mention of the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles in German treaties with other countries only as
(1) Cooke and Stickney "Readings In European Internat ional
Relations" p. 5
(2) Ibid p. 22
(3 Ibid p. 24
(4) The last decade of the nineteenth century
(5) Driault "La reprise de Constant inople ,r p. 18
" l rAllemagne n*avait aucime situation dans ces regions,
done aucun droit a y faire valoir, aucune traditions a y
poursuivre; elle y venait heurter toutes les traditions,
sans raucines dans le passe, quelque chose ainsi d T anormal,
ou, comme on dit en biologie, de monstrueux.
"
„J
.i
,
,
.
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a means to securing Germany’s desires in other questions
His policy in the crisis of 1878, was, as we have seen, pur-
posefully vague, and his note added to the secret annex of
the Triple Alliance of 1887 confirms the general belief that
it was Bismarck’s intention not to involve Germany in the
question of the Straits. This note read: ”It is not to our
interest to fight for the program and equally so not to op-
pose it. We can fight only for Germany’s interests, and they
are not concerned here”.
With the fall of Bismarck in 1890 there was so much
pressure brought to bear on Kaiser Wilhelm II that the German
Empire definitely entered the question of the Straits. In 1891,
Hatzfeld, who had been the German Ambassador in Turkey after
the Treaty of Berlin, advised the Kaiser to pay a ceremonial
visit to the Sultan. Hatzfeld knew that fear and hate of
Russia governed Turkish foreign policy, that England had lost
almost every shred of what popularity survived her occupation
of Cyprus by her occupation of Egypt, and that France was
regarded as a decadent nation. From the Turkish point of view
German friendship was worth great sacrifices, because to curb
the ambitions of the Balkan states, the Ottoman Empire had to
rely on Austria over which country Germany could exercise a
check. Besides this political reason, there was the economic
side to the story. A group of German capitalists owned the
trunk railway on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. They
( 1 )
(2)
I
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encouraged the government to ally itself with the Porte so
that their interests might be protected. Henceforth, Germany
plays the same part in Turkish foreign policy that Prance
played in the early eighteenth century, and that Russia attempted
to play at Unkiar-Skelessi
.
Of the other Powers, France played a defensive game,
and welcomed a German policy which must antagonize Russia.
Italy watched, but was not strong enough until 1910 to follow
an independent policy. Hov/ever
,
in 1909 in a Russo-Italian
accord, she agreed to consider the Russian interests in the
question of the Straits. England remained indifferent, as-
suming a conciliatory and humanitarian policy until the growth
of the German Navy frightened her into taking a livelier in-
terest in Hear Eastern affairs.
Russia watched the progress of German influence with
disquiet, although the ingratitude of Bulgaria and the in-
creasing diversion of her energy to the Far East compelled her
to place the question of Constant inople and the Straits second
in line. However, in 1896, when the massacre of Armenians
spread to Constant inople and aroused intense indignation in
England and to a less degree in Prance and Italy, the Tsar's
Government made it clear that a V/estern naval demonstration
before Constant inople would be regarded as a menace to Russian
interests. The Turks, however, showed no great sign of grati-
tude for this service.
<>
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In 1897 came the war with Greece in which the German
tutors of the Turkish army acquired fresh prestige at Constan-
tinople. In 1898 a long list of events led the rest of Europe
to feel certain that the Kaiser was determined to play the
part of the 7/estern ally and protector to the Ottoman. Turkey
conceded the port of Haidar Pasha to the German Anatolian
Railways Company. The Kaiser visited the Sultan and the Holy
Land. The question of the Straits 'became an issue of the
highest importance to German commercial and military policy,
for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were Bridges on the road
that was to bring German influence down to the Persian Gulf
and to turn aside the British sea-power by Turco-German rail-
way power, and to unite Pan-Islamism and Germany’s military
power. The great plan failed, Pan-Islamism proved less formid-
able than the Kaiser had hoped and the British had feared,
since Persians, Arabs, Egyptians and even Turks were more in-
fected by nationalism than any European suspected, and were
therefore unwilling to cooperate for the doubtful benefit of
Islam and the certain profit of the Kaiser. But this threat
to the British Empire in the East was more serious than Hapo-
leon’s. To Russia the change was less threatening. Even if
the Turkish bridge remained in pro-German hands, the Russian
Government might hope to cut off the eastern road in the
Balkans, and in the last resort might even win Constant inople.
In any case the Russians believed that they could afford to
wait, and could, in the meantime, win fresh realms in the Par
East. German diplomacy encouraged this belief.
-
.
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In 1895 the Russian Government, desiring to despatch
warships from the Black Sea for service in the Pacific, an-
nounced that in the future "it would come to an arrangement
with the Sultan alone in regard to the conditions of passage
( 1 )
for her war-vessels”. The British Government objected, insis-
ting that it was the duty of the Tsar’s Government to obtain
the consent of all the Powers which had signed the Treaty of
London. In the same year, the fear of an anti-Christian out-
break at Constantinople led the Six Powers to demand the Porte’s
authorization of the passage of the Straits by light vessels
and their entry into the Golden Horn. After long negotiations
the Turkish Government agreed to the temporary and provisional
authorization of the entry of an additional light vessel repre-
senting each Power, subject to the recognized limitation of
t onnage.
In an Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 which formed the
basis of Austro-Russian policy in the Balkans up to 1908, the
two countries recognized that the question of the Straits had
an eminently European character, and, therefore, could not be
made the object of a separate understanding between Austria-
Hungary and Russia.
In 1898 there arose a complication when the Bulgarian
Government, which had ordered a torpedo-gunboat in France,
asked for permission to send this ship through the Straits
to the Black Sea ports of the Principali ty . The Porte at
first refused to grant permission, maintaining that Bulgaria
(l) Phillipson and Buxton - p. 163
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had no right to possess warships, and that her naval defense
was assured by the Ottoman fleet. Since in reality, the Ottoman
fleet had been so scandously neglected as to be almost inactive
and could protect nobody, the Bulgarians did not relish the
prospect that their only warships would be prevented from enter-
ing Bulgarian waters. In the end the matter was settled in
their favor by the good offices of the Powers.
In the autumn of 1902 the Sultan allowed four torpedo-
boats of the Russian Mediterranean squadron to enter the Black
Sea for the naval review at Livadia, but on condition that they
should pass the Straits under the mercantile flag, without
armament or full crews and at intervals of twenty-four hours.
In January 1903, the British Ambassador at Constant inople pro-
tested to the Porte against the granting of this authorization,
describing it as an infringement of the Treaty of London, and
declared that his Government reserved the right to claim the
same privilege. The German press seized the opportunity to
attack the British claims, and the English press responded by
prophesying a German alliance with Russia in any Russo-Br it i sh
controversy. The secret of Russian demand and German sympathy
was the desire of the Tsar to obtain a precedent for the pass-
age of its vessels into the Mediterranean for eventual use in
the China Seas, and the German wish to assist Russia in en-
tangling herself in the Par East. The most interesting feature
of this incident was the changeabout in the policies of Great
Britain and Russia. At Berlin Lord Salisbury had declared that
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British engagements on the subject of the Straits were not
"of a general European or int ernat ional character, hut were
engagements towards the Sultan only,” while Count Shuvalov
maintained that the rule of the Straits was based upon the
joint agreement of the six Signatory Powers. In 1903 the
Russians defended Lord Salisbury 1 s position, and the Marquis
4 )
of Lansdowne defended Count Shuvalov's;
The Russo-Japanese "Jar of 1904-5 once more raised the
question of the passage of the Straits by warships. The Black
Sea fleet, which might have given the Russians the victory at
Tsushima, remained imprisoned by the Treaty of London. In the
summer of 1904, two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet
passed through the Straits from the Black Sea under the Russian
mercantile flag, and entered the Red Sea from Port Said. These
and the other ships of the Volunteer Fleet served in peace-time
both as merchantmen and as Government transports; they were
commanded by naval officers who bore the Tsar's commission, and
were notoriously used as auxiliary cruisers in time of war.
In 1891 the Russian Government and the Porte had agreed that
ships of the Volunteer Fleet might not pass through the Straits
with military material on board and with crews on a war footing,
how these two vessels, when they had entered the Red Sea had
hoisted the naval flag, mounted guns which they had carried
from Sebastopol and seized vessels on the charge of carrying
contraband of war. Their capture of the S. S. Malacca in July
of 1904 aroused a British protest on the ground that if the
(l) Graves, Philip p. 137
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captor was a warship, the Russian Government had violated
existing treaties by sending men-of-war through the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles without the necessary permission of the Porte.
If, on the other hand, the captor was a merchantman, her com-
mander had broken that principle of International Law whereby
belligerent operations can only be carried out by properly
commissioned warships. In the end the Russian Government
revoked the commissions of these two vessels.
Attention was again attracted to the Straits by events
in Southern Russia. During the revolution of 1905, the crev/
of one of the battleships mutinied and put to sea from Sebas-
topol. Their action caused great alarm at Constant inople
,
but the crew did not attempt the Bosphorus, and soon surren-
dered to the Rumanians.
The whole series of incidents, which have just been
reviev/ed, confirmed the impression that the Treaty of London
had failed. By entitling the Sultan to open the Straits at
his discretion to the warships of friendly and allied Powers,
in case he deemed it necessary in order to secure the execution
of the Treaty of Paris, decisions of international importance
were left to the arbitrary discretion of Turkey acting alone
or inspired by another Power which might have acquired a strong
diplomatic position at Constant inople • It thus increased the
rivalry between the Powers as to which could exert the most
influence over the Sultan, and finally led to the control of
the Straits by one Government - Germany.
\
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Driven back to her former field of activity by her
failure in the Far East, Russia occupied the years 1906-12
in attempting to counter the Austro-Hungarian political pene-
tration of the Balkans. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907
which ended the rivalry between the British and Russian Empires
in Asia, was to lead before long to a fundamental change in
the British attitude toward the question of the Straits, al-
though German naval rivalry was the principal cause of this
change. A secondary cause was the growth of Austro-Hungarian
naval power, and the doubt that persisted as to the attitude
of Italy in the event of hostilities between the Triple Entente
and the Triple Alliance. The British fleet was increasingly
concentrated in northern waters. Meanwhile British insistence
on the reform of Turkish administration in Macedonia, though
it was inspired by a common sense desire to remove a cause
of internat ional strife by pacifying a land exposed to the
conflicting ambitions of great and lesser Powers, gave German
diplomacy a further advantage at Constant inople
.
On July 2, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, IzVoWki,
while accepting the Turkish concessions to Austria for a rail-
way, announced that he was ready to discuss changes, such as
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Sanjak by
Austria in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian
warships. The Young Turk Revolution of this same month pro-
vided the opportunity for carrying out this suggestion. In
August the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, secured the
cc
consent of his allies, Germany and Italy, to the proposal,
and met Izvolski at Buchlau in Bohemia. As a result, Austria
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina the next October and announced
the evacuation of Sanjak. Izvolski declared Aehrenthal had
acted without his knowledge, and insisted upon a conference
to ratify the action, hoping to secure compensations for
Russia at the same time. He therefore went to London to gain
a)
British consent to this plan. Grey agreed that changes in
the Treaty of Berlin required the agreement of all signatories,
but he made it plain that the question of the Straits must not
be raised at the conference. As time went on, the idea of a
conference lapsed, and Austria paid Turkey monetary compensa-
tion. Russia was deeply humiliated.
Y/estern liberals had hoped that the Turkish Revolution
might bring a change in foreign policy. But they were quickly
disillusioned, for by 1910 the Young Turk politicians were
nearly as pro-German as the Young Turk soldiers. The strong
Jewish element in the Committee of Union and Progress, the
party governing Turkey, was anti-Russian, and was allied with
the Jewish capitalists and press of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
However, the Russian Government made a serious attempt in 1911
to obtain concessions on the subject of the Straits from the
new regime. In the fall of that year*, war broke out between
Italy and the Porte. The Italian Government threatened to
blockade the Dardanelles. Late in Hovember, Tcharykov, the
Russian Ambassador, while conversing with the Grand Vizier and
(1) Despatch from Grey to Nicholson "Twenty-five Years 1892-1916
/ol, I, p. 176-179 Found also in British Documents on the
Origins of the War 1898-1914 Vol. V, #379
«o
•
4 -
-
O
;
®
82.
the Foreign Minister, suggested the opening of the Straits to
Russian warships. The Turks replied that they would not nego-
tiate without the concurrence of the other Signatories of the
Treaty of Berlin, and added that even if these Powers consented
to the change in the rule of the Straits, the Ottoman Govern-
ment was not prepared to consent. On December 4th the Russian
Anbassador delivered a note from his Government to the Sublime
Porte. The note claimed "liberty of passage for Russian war-
ships, while maintaing the old principle of exclusion for the
(i)
warships of other foreign States*. The Porte replied to the
note in an emphatic negative, and said that the acceptance of
the Russian proposals would be equal to the acceptance of a
Russian Protectorate. The British and French Governments,
which previously had been sounded by Russia, informed the Porte
that they would consent to the proposed departure from the
Rule of the Straits, if the Porte agreed to it; if it did not
agree, they would not exercise any pressure on Turkey. The
German and Austrian Governments, on the other hand, opposed
any change in the Rule, and urged the Porte to refuse the
Russian proposals. The rejection of Russia’s proposal by
Turkey convinced the former that the Porte was in close diploma-
tic relations with the Central Powers, and it was not surprising,
therefore, that in the next year Russia encouraged the Balkan
Alliance at which they might otherwise have looked askance.
The Italian war dragged on. Italian demonstrations at
the mouth of the Dardanelles led the Turks to declare the
(l) Phillipson and Buxton p. 190
(
83
Dardanelles closed to all shipping, hut after a month they
were opened in deference to a Russian protest. The Italians
did not repeat the attack hut turned their attention in another
direction. The war ended on October 18th, 1912; and as it
ended, the first Balkan War began.
By 1914, as a result of the Balkan Wars, Turkey had
been left with only a small region around Constant inople as
the remnant of her former large Umpire in Europe. In this
study, we have no particular interest in these Balkan Wars,
but three points are to be noted: "1. When the Bulgarian army
had reached the Chatalja lines, the Porte, by encouraging
rumors that before the Turks left Constant inople they would
drown the city in Christian blood, caused the Six Powers, Spain,
Holland, and Rumania, to demand and obtain permission to send
warships to Constantinople for the protection of their subjects.
2. Before peace was negotiated in London after the first war,
the Bulgars appear to have been warned by Russia not to claim
Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora, but to content themselves with
Thrace, west of the Enos-Midi a line. 3. The Greeks won the
islands of Samothrace and also Lemnos, with its fine harbor
of Mudros, which gave them a most advantageous naval position
against the Turks. They remained, moreover, in occupation of
the isles of Imbros and Tenedos, pending the settlement of the
ownership of the islands of Chios and Mitylene which the Turks
had only ceded under protest, and with the intention of making
war on Greece as soon as their dreadnoughts were completed by
..
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British ship "builders. The second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria
fought her allies and was beaten while the Turks reoccupied
Adrianople, was a sore disappointment for Russian diplomacy.
Bulgaria’s exasperation made her the potential ally of the
Austro-Hu arian Empire against the Serbs, and of Turkey against
the Greeks
From the autumn of 1913, German influence at Constant inople
grew stronger. Late in that year General Liman Ton Sanders was
sent to Constant inople by the German Government as military ad-
viser to the Turkish Government and was appointed to the command
over the Metropolitan Army Corps, which included the forts of
the Bosphorus. The Russian Government protested and was sup-
ported by France and Great Britain. The Porte agreed to give
Liman the appointment of Inspector General of the First Army;
but the warning confirmed Russian fears, and stimulated Russian
military and naval preparations. On the advice of Sazonov, the
Tsar appointed a committee to prepare a program of action
v/hich, if necessary, would defend Russian interests at the
of German control of the Turkish masters of the Straits, for
it meant a permanent threat to her huge commerce built up by
two centuries of hard labor in her Southlands. Turkey, on the
other hand, welcomed the Kaiser’s friendship, for he governed
the strongest Continental State, and Russia was the Turk’s
nat i onal enemy
•
(1) Graves pp. 142-3
(2) There is an excellent collection of the diplomatic corre-
spondence relating to this incident in Cooke and Sticknev
pp. 267-279
^ J
1)
( 2 )
Straits
It was only natural that Russia should have such a fear
?
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In June 1914 the Russian Government made another at-
tempt to improve its position. The Tsar made a visit to the
King of Rumania, after which "both countries presented similar
notes to the Porte, pointing out the disadvantages caused by
the temporary closing of the Straits to foreign merchantmen
during the Italian and Balkan ’Jars.
The Great ’Jar Broke in the Balkans, in June of 1914,
and "by August, the five Great Powers, Belgium and Serbia were
at war; Turkey was mobilizing and had signed a Treaty of Alii-
(i)
ance with Germany. Great indignation was caused when it was
heard that the British Government had laid hands, as it was
entitled to do, on the Turkish dreadnoughts preparing for the
sea in England. On August 10th, two German cruisers, the
"Goeben’*and "Breslau", fleeing from British pursuit, took
refuge in the Dardanelles. The next day it was announced that
they had been purchased by Turkey. Three days later, the
officers of the British Naval Mission in Turkey were removed
from their executive command. Mines were laid in the Dardanelles,
Germans began to reach Turkey by rail through Bulgaria, and the
German crews of the "purchased warships" stayed on board. Late
in September the Dardanelles were closed to merchant shipping;
the "Goeben" and "Breslau" began to cruise in the Black Sea
with Turkish flags and German crews; the influx of German sai-
lors and soldiers continued; while the Grand Vizier, practically
the prisoner of the pro-German faction of the Committee of
Union and Progress, still spoke of Turkish neutrality to the
(l) Text of this treaty is in Cooke and Stickney p. 407

protesting Ministers of the Entente. On the night of October
27th the German ships and the Turkish fleet under Admiral Sow-
chon entered the Black Sea. Two days later they raided Odessa
and Theodosia, and sank two small Russian men-of-war. By the
(i)
twelfth of November Turkey was at war v/ith the allies.
The entry of the Turks into the Great War on the side
of the Central Powers gave Russia the chance for which she
had waited for generations. The Tsar*s Government rapidly
made up its mind to secure the consent of France and Great
Britain to the contingent annexation of Constantinople and the
areas about the Straits. Before Turkey declared war, but when
her Government clearly intended to join Germany, Sazonov, the
Russian Foreign Hinister, appears to have suggested a combina-
tion of internat ionalizat ion and earlier Russian proposals as
a solution of the problem of the Strait s. After the Turkish
attack on Odessa and Theodosia, however, there was a natural
desire among the Russians for larger concessions, and while
*
the French Government was at first unwilling to express its
opinion, the British were in favor of satisfying the Russian
ambitions. No time was lost in opening negotiations, for the
soldiers were beginning to forsee the effects of closing the
Straits on the Russian supply of arms and munitions, and grew
still more anxious when the Turks in unexpected strength began
to invade Transcaucasia. So, when the Russian General Staff
raised the question of an Anglo-French attack upon the Straits,
(l) The ,,Goeben ,, and Breslau" affair and the closing of the
Dardanelles were two of the reasons that the commission
created by the Preliminary Peace Conference of 1919 gave
for placing part of the responsibility for the War on
Turkey.
-.
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the Government pressed harder for the early acceptance of its
demands "before the expedition landed, and at the same time
deprecated any attempt on the part of the Western allies to
"bring Greece over to their side. Russia feared that her allies,
if they reached Constantinople first, would propose a solution
of the question of the Straits falling far short of Russian
hopes, unless she had previously "bound them "by formal engage-
ments. The Greeks, whom the Russian people distrusted as much
as did Nicholas, would in that case merely complicate the situ-
ation. The Allies, on the other hand, were afraid that without
some assurance as to Constant inople
,
Russia might sign a
separate peace.
On March 4, 1915 the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed
a memorandum to the British and French Ambassadors, setting
forth the territorial claims of Russia in event of success in
the war. They were defined as follows:
"The town of Constantinople, the western coa.st of the
Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora and of the Dardanelles;
southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line; the coast of
Asia Minor, between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and
a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the isla.nds
in the Sea of Marmora a.nd the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.
The special rights of England and France in the above terri-
CD
t cries shall remain inviolate".
The memorandum went on to say that both the British and
French Governments expressed their willingness to agree to the
(l) Graves p. 153
..
.
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wishes of the Russian Government in event of victory, provided
that a number of British arid French claims in the Ottoman
Empire and elsewhere were satisfied.
The case for accepting the Russian claim to the Straits
was so strong that the British Government had to reverse its
ancient policy, to which it had "been less attached since German
sea-power had ‘become threatening. The French, after their alli-
ance with Russia, were less opposed to the opening of the
Straits to the Russian warships, since the addition of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet to their Mediterranean squadron would
place them in a position of undisputed superiority/- to the
Austro-Hungarian and Italian Fleets. Both obtained guarantees
for their economic interests in Turkey, and the British secured
(i)
an extension of their sphere of interest in Persia.
It was not until the winter of 1916-17 that the existence
of this Straits Agreement was officially made known. Its main-
tenance had become an issue of Russian internal policy, since
the reactionaries, fearing that revolution would break out if
the war continued, hinted that England never intended to let
Russia have the Straits. In March 1916, Hilyukov declared
in the Duma that though Russia did not begin the war for the
Straits and Constantinople, she would not end it without them.
The debates in the Duma led to questions in the House of Commons
which the British Foreign Secretary had to answer evasively,
and he therefore raised the question of publishing the agree-
ment as a means of fighting propaganda and Russian defeatism.
(l) A secret treaty was signed by England, France, and Russia
guaranteeing each other's rights in Constantinople, the
Straits, and Persia.
{.
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The British Government communicated with the Tsar, saying
that it would stand by the Straits Agreement and urged him not
to let his nation he led away by hostile intrigues. Nicholas
answered that he was in favor of an official declaration by
his Government, announcing that the Allies regarded the acqui-
sition of Constantinople by Russia as an immutable condition
of peace. Rumania, v/ho had finally joined the Entente, was
informed of the agreement
,
and assured that she would be guar-
anteed free passage through the Straits for her ships; and on
December 2, 1916 the Russian Prime Minister, Trepov, made a
statement before the Duma. Russia had struggled for a thou-
sand years for a free passage through the Straits. Turkey
had attacked her, and in 1915 Great Britain and France, joined
later by Italy, had agreed that Constantinople and the Straits
should fall to Russia. On Christmas the Tsar issued a message
to his army, in which he described the acquisition of Constan-
tinople and the Straits as one of the war aims of the country
which must be achieved before peace was made. The declaration
fell flat, for Russia had lost heart.
Milyukov became Foreign Minister under the Provisional
Government set up after the Revolution of March 1917. He ad-
vocated the acquisition of Constantinople, and hoped to con-
tinue the policy of Sazonov. But the statement of the Prime
Minister, Kerensky, that Russia did not need the Straits but
would agree to their internationalization, provided that she
obtained a free passage to the Mediterranean, confused the
.>•
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situat ion
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Milyukov and the General Staff appear to have been
discussing an expedition against the Bosphorus, when the enter-
prise was vetoed by the ¥ar Minister, and the increasing pres-
sure of the Soviet of Soldiers and Workmen and of the politicians
attracted by the slogan "ho annexations and no indemnities”,
made confusion worse, and finally drove Milyukov to resign. His
successor, Tereshchenko, followed Kerensky r s ideas, and Kerensky,
in May 1917, advocated a peace on the basis of the self-deter-
mination of nations, without annexations and without indemnities.
Two months later, the army began to break up under the prompt-
ings of the Bolshevists within and the pressure of the Austro-
German armies. The Government proposed an inter-allied confer-
ence, with the object of revising the Secret Treaties; but on
November 7, 1917, the day when the Foreign Minister was to
leave for Paris, the Bolshevist revolution broke out, and Russia
went down in bloodshed and civil war.
On June 11, 1917, King Constantine of Greece had been
forced to abdicate by the British and French Governments, and
henceforth Greece followed Venizelos. The Greek people slowly
realized that Constantinople might not be lost after all, and
they joined in the war on the side of the Entente. Their alli-
ance turned the scale in the Balkans; the battle of the Vardar
drove Bulgaria out of the war; the Greek troops were marching
on Constantinople, when the Turks heavily defeated in Palestine
and cut off from their German Allies threw themselves on the
mercy of the victors. On November 9, 1918, British troops
.'
i
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occupied the forts by the Dardanelles, thus placing that water-
way in Christian hands for the first time in more than five and
a half centuries. Four days later the Allies were in possession
of the capital.

CONCLUSION
After the War
The year 1916-1917 was one of peace negotiations. In
the several suggestions made we find Austria ready to make a
secret armistice with Russia provided that the question of
Constantinople were not made an issue^while the Allies demanded
that the Straits be free and open in the future. It was ru-
mored that Russia attempted to make a separate peace with the
Central Powers agreeing to ask nothing of Austria-Hungary and
to restore all occupied territories to Germany, provided that
the latter would agree that the Dardanelles and a strip of
land on either side would be neutralized under the control of
a sovereign int ernat ional commission in which all maritime
states should be represented, with a double representation for
those states having territory on the Black Sea.
None of these proposals were followed up by any action
until January 1918 when Wilson put into definite form several
conditions of peace that had been left vague by others. The
twelfth of the fourteen points which he outlined read: "The
Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be as-
sured a secure sovereignty but the other nationalities which are
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security
of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as
a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under
( 1 )
international guarantees".
(i) Cooke and Stickney p. 550
—.
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International control of the navigation of these
waterways was clearly desirable, but schemes for the inter-
nationalization of the Government of Constantinople and the
zone of the Straits presented innumerable difficulties. It
was easy to talk of a "Pree City of Constant inople " , or of
a "Neutral territory of the Straits", under the guarantee of
the League of Nations; but how was the League, a new born
institution, possessing no executive powers, incapable of
exercising compulsion, to assume such grave responsibilities?
International jealousies prevented the suggestion that
the "Mandate for Constantinople" should be assigned to one of
the Great Powers of Europe. Neutral states would not accept
the task; and the hope that the United States would agree to
be the Llandatory for Turkey, or for any province or area de-
tached from Turkey was speedily dispelled.
There remained two claimants to the City and the Straits,
Turkey and Greece. The chance that the Great Powers would allow
Turkey to retain her capital and its sea-gates seemed small in-
deed. The Greek claim was based on tradition and history.
Unfortunately for all concerned except the Turks, the
victors were in no hurry to make peace in the Near East. It
was not until the early summer of 1920 that the terms of the
Treaty to be imposed upon Turkey were communicated to the Porte.
The Treaty of Sevres was based upon the assumption that the
retention of the control over the Marmora Basin and the Straits
by a single power, i. e. Turkey, was injurious to the general
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interest. To that end Thrace, with the exception of the
(i)
Constantinople area within the Chatalja lines, was to he ceded
to Greece, which thus obtained the Gallipoli Peninsula. The
whole coastland of the Marmora, the adjoining territorial
waters, the islands within the Straits, and Lemnos, Imbros,
Tenedos, Samothrace, and Mitylene outside them were to form a
special zone within which the British, French, and Italian
Governments might alone maintain military, naval, or aerial
forces. With unimportant exceptions, no Greek or Turkish armed
forces could be maintained in this region. Article XXXVII
defined the freedom of the Straits as follows: "The navigation
of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora,
and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and
war to every vessel of commerce or of war, and to military and
commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag. These waters
shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent
right be exercised nor any act of hostility committed within
them unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the
( 2 )
League of Nations."
The Treaty set up a Commission of the Straits composed
of representatives of the Great Powers, excluding Germany, but
including the United States and Russia, should they join the
League, who would each have two votes, and those of Greece,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey who were to have one vote each.
(1) Article XXXVI recognized the rights and title of the
Turkish Government over Constantinople.
(2) Cooke and Stickney- Text of the Treaty of Sevres p. 754
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The Commission was to have the administrative control of the
navigation of the Straits; its members v/ere to enjoy diplomatic
privileges; it was to have its ovm flag, budget, and water
( 1 )
police. By Article XLIV, the Commission was to inform the
representatives of the three Powers at Constantinople - Great
Britain, Prance and Italy - which were allowed to keep military
establishments in the Straits, of any interference with the
liberty of navigation within the area under control of the
Commissioners. The representatives of these Powers would then
take the necessary defensive measures in concert v/ith the naval
and military commands of their forces in the Propontis.
«
Prom the outset the Treaty of Sevres was disliked by
Italy and Prance. and was never ratified by Turkey who began to
take steps to modify it. Her first move was in the Angora
Agreement of 1921 with Prance, by which Turkey got back Alexan-
dretta and Cilicia. She then recaptured Smyrna and threatened
to take Constantinople. In the summer of 1922 the Greek armies
of occupation in the Smyrna region were routed and the Allies
v/ere ready to make concessions. The Mudania armistice was
signed permitting the Turkish nationalists to retain Smyrna and
to assume the administration of Constantinople. It was followed
by a Peace Conference held at Lausanne. Attached to a treaty
there drawn up was a Straits Convention. Its first article
states that the signatories agree to recognize and declare the
principle of the freedom of transit and navigation by sea and
air through the Straits, which includes the Dardanelles, the
(1) Articles XXXVIII, XXXIX, and XL
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Bosphorus, and the Sea of Marmora. Article II states that the
rules governing the movements of commercial and military vessels
and aircraft will he regulated hy the provisions of an Annex
which states that, in time of war, Turkey being neutral, war
vessels and military aircraft enjoy the same right of passage
under the same limitations, which will not he applicable to any
belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in
the Black Sea. The military aircraft or warships of belliger-
ents are forbidden to exercise their belligerent rights in the
Straits if Turkey is neutral. In time of war, with Turkey a
belligerent, neutral warships have equally complete freedom of
passage, and neutral military aircraft may pass "at their own
risk and peril", and will alight to submit to investigation of
their character. The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy
aircraft and warships from using the Straits must not be such
as to prevent neutral vessels and aircraft of all categories
from passing through the Straits, and Turkey agrees to provide
such vessels and aircraft with "the necessary instructions or
pilots" for that purpose.
Articles X-XVT provide for the establishment of an
International Straits Commission carrying out its function under
the supervision of the League of Nations to which it will report.
The Commission is composed of representatives of Prance, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia, Jugo-
slavia, and the United States, under the perpetual presidency of
the Turkish representative.
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No serious incident has troubled the Straits Commission
since its formation but there remains in every one's mind the
question: V/hat v/ill happen v/hen Russia becomes a revived Power?
When she is able to demand her rights, will she not ask for the
closing of the Straits in war, and how will she secure such a
change in the present rule?
———— , J
r
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SUMMARY
The question of the Straits, as seen in the foregoing
survey, has "been one of world wide interest since the beginnings
of history because of its economic as well as political aspect.
The Trojans held the Straits until Athens gained control of the
Black Sea route. In the Peloponnesian War, Sparta ended Athen-
ian supremacy and became the lord of these parts, until aft.er
330 A. D. when Byzantine authority over the Straits and Constanti-
nople preserved the civilization of Europe,
To the medieval Italian trading cities, control of the
Straits was a vital issue upon which rested their very means of
existence. Of these Genoa gained supreme authority until Turkey
became interested. She, by a gradual conquest that lasted for
over a century, was able to seize the Dardanelles by 1356 and
almost one hundred years later Constant inople
,
thus establish-
ing her permanent control of the Straits. However, the states
of western Europe were still able to pass through the Straits and
navigate Turkish waters for commercial purposes because of a
series of treaties, known as capitulations, which they made with
the Porte.
At the end of the seventeenth century, Russia pressed
southward and began to threaten the Turkish monopoly of the
Black Sea. To gain an outlet for the production of the south
was the object of the policy founded by Peter the Great and
followed by his successors. Catherine II succeeded in iaugura-
ting the modern phase of the Eastern question by ending the
exclusive Turkish control of the Straits and the Black Sea in
[r
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the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardj i i which opened them to merchant-
ships flying the Russian flag.
The Western sea-powers, upon seeing this Russian activ-
ity, were aroused, and the question became more complicated
economically and politically. The eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries saw a struggle ‘between Russia and Western Europe for
the control of a strategic position at the Straits. England
played the part of the protector of the Ottoman Empire while
Prance played her cards as she thought best in each particular
situation. The height of Russian influence was marked by the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833. All Europe became alarmed
at the privileges granted herein to Russia, and consequently
the diplomats of the day set out to cancell the advantages
which Russia had thus acquired. They accomplished their pur-
pose in the Treaty of London and the Convention of the Straits
in 1841. This act served as one of the causes of the Crimean
War which was settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 which hu-
miliated Russia by neutralizing the Black Sea. Upon Russians
consequent denunciation of the Treaty of Paris the Powers met
at London and signed the Treaty of London in 1871 which, although
it left the rule as to the closing of the Straits the same as
it was under the treaties of 1841 and 1856, it enabled Russia
to build and maintain a fleet in the Black Sea and thus become
once again a menace to Constantinople.
In the years 1871-1878, as a result of the trouble in
the Balkans, there was much bickering between the Powers,
W.
.
,
100
especially between England and Russia, over the question of
the Straits. But all diplomatic maneuvers of the period were
for nought, because the Treaty of Berlin confirmed the status
quo set forth in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and that of
London in 1871.
The last years of the nineteenth century and the begin-
ning of the twentieth were marked by several incidents which
necessitated interpretations of the rule of the Straits. They
&&& also marked by the more active interest in the question
of the Straits upon the part of Germany who succeeded in be-
coming so influential at the Porte that Turkey joined the
Central Pov/ers in the Y/orld War, one side of which represented
an international resistance to German control of this passage
way to the East.
The defeat of Germany, the break-up of the Hapsburg
realm and of the Ottoman Empire, and the change in the policy
of Russia made the control of the whole Black Sea basin by
any single Power, or even by any association of Powers, im-
probable, but the Straits may again be controlled in war time
by a single Power or a group of Powers and there looms before
us the possibility of a revived and able Soviet Russia with
ambitions in the direction of the Straits.
The Freedom of the Straits is said to mean that "•commerce
should be able to count on a free passage through them, whether
..
. ^ fl)the riverain Power or Powers are at peace or at war.*" Does
(l) Graves p. 202 A quotation from "History of the Peace
Conference at Paris" Vol. VI, p. 60
(r-
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the Treaty of Lausanne guarantee this freedom? The present
settlement amounts to a partial internat ionalizat ion of the
Straits, which would most assuredly cease as soon as the
Turkish Republic was engaged in war with a maritime Power.
Turkey is at present pacifically inclined, but her future is
uncertain. Her progress up to date has been largely the work
of one great man - Ghazi • A weak or rash successor might in-
volve Turkey in fresh conflicts, and a war which closed the
Straits to neutral shipping would be disastrous to European
trade
*
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